Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎57r] (113/544)

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including reinforcements, number only 1,700, which was
not a Brigadier-General’s command.
(c.) At Bushire, a Brigadier-General now commanded, and was
fully occupied with preparations for a possible advance
in the autumn.
(d.) Divorce of Indian troops from the South Persia Rifles would
duplicate administration with resultant complications of
any questions of supplies, ammunition, and personnel.
The telegram also stated that the consideration of these factors
led the Indian Government to the conclusion that the proposed
appointment would be better deferred until the Shiraz situation had
been cleared ; and, further, that as one authority should exercise
military and political control, it seemed to the Indian Government
that the command of Indian troops under that Government’s political
control, and the command of the South Persia Rifles, politically
directed from Teheran, would hardly work with harmony and good
results. The telegram concluded with the statement that no move
ment inland was contemplated at present from Bushire. As regards
Bundar Abbas, it did not seem to the Government of India to be
wise at the present juncture, on both military and political grounds,
to suspend a movement which was primarily intended to reinforce
and supply Shiraz, to steady the Kawam and his tribe, and to
siipport the Kerman Brigade of the South Persia Rifles.
It was generally agreed by the Committee that the Goveimment of
India had. made out a good case, and that action on the
Committee's decision of the 21st June should be regarded as
suspended for the time being.
Russian Turkestan. 3. The Chairman said that the question of the present situation
in Russian Turkestan was raised in respect of two telegrams. The
first (E.C. 65(1) was a despatch from the Caucasus military agent,
Colonel Pike, stating that a representative from Turkestan had been
interviewing him, outlining the general situation as it appeared to
him from the information received, and indicating the line of action
he recommended should be pursued. The Chairman pointed out
that Colonel Pike’s telegram was dated the 20th May, that it had
been despatched on the 20th June, and had only been received in
England nine days later. It was, therefore, six weeks old. The
second (E C. 651) was a telegram from the Commander-in-Chief in
India, dated the 26th June, forwarding a message from Major Redl,
stating that in Redi’s opinion no time should be lost in getting into
touch with the new situation, and requesting permission to send
Captain Teague Jones to Trans-Caspia with the primary object of
interrupting the railway. The Chairman said that it appeared that
Captain Teague Jones and Captain Jarvis had apparently already
been despatched on their mission.
General Radclifle said that the view of the War Office was that
it was well worth while to send officers to Krasnovodsk in order to
attempt to get into touch with the friendly elements of the
population, and to prevent the export of cotton from I urkestan
by German agents. He suggested that certain selected officers
from Dunsterville s force should be sent from Enzeli to
Krasnovodsk, and possibly a small detachment of troops if the
situation was found to be promising. His department had been
informed that we had secured six ships on the Caspian Sea which
we could utilise for our purposes. He understood that Bicharakof
was already embarking his force, which consisted of 1,500 men and
four armoured cars, at Enzeli, en route to Baku. General Radclifle
said that his department was not quite satisfied that General Marshall
fully appreciated the situation, and the necessity of immediate steps
being taken to interrupt the Trans-Caspian railway. This inter-