Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎74r] (147/544)

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2. That the populations of these areas shall have full opportunity of developing
into independent civilised peoples.
Our war policy is on the above hypothesis to use all political and military assets
available in that area to achieve that objective.
To do that we must—
1 Keep the Allies together. .
2 . Develop the Arab movement on sane linos.
3. Concentrate on hitting the enemy militarily and politically whenever circum
stances permit.
1 In order to keep the Allies together, we must conciliate the Italians. I suggest
this were best done by agreeing to appoint an Italian adviser on Italian interests in
Palestine and a French adviser on French interests in Palestine to the G.O.C., E.E.F.
M. Picot is prepared to support this idea. If it be accepted, there is a complete end
to inequality, and the advisers’ duties can be defined. The Italians will not, 1 think,
be ditlicult in matters of definition and limitation so long as it is clear that there is no
difference in status between the two advisers. We must also eorciliate the French.
This we can do by coming to an understanding as to the position of the French High
Commissioner in Syria in the event of our occupying any part of Syria. I am aware
that this is difficult, and military objections will be raised, but the matter is one of
importance, and 1 regard it as essential to disabuse the French of any idea of our
having ulterior motives in Syria. I regard this suspicion on the part of the French
as dangerous to the Entente as a whole, and any arrangement we may make in regard
to Palestine must be such as to lead to its removal.
2. In order to develop the Arab movement properly, I submit that the following
steps should be taken :—
(a.) That we and the French should submit the suggested joint declaration to the
King of Ilejaz (Annex (C)), and get the main lines published and known to all Arab
speaking peoples we can get into touch with.
It may be that there is an objection to the no-annexation clause, but if we are
to counter the Turk propaganda we must be clear on this point; we may reserve the
right to make ourselves temporarily responsible for order and defence in certain areas,
and, if it is thought fit,, we could introduce words to that effect, but we must make it
clear that we do not intend to seize and make part of our Empires any portion of the
Arabic-speaking world.
(b.) This done, we could then start—
(i.) A general propaganda among the various Syrian countries in Egypt and
America, both north and south ;
(ii.) Promote conferences amongst the various Arab chiefs of the peninsula;
(iii.) Make our Mesopotamian policy plain to the public by the press accounts of
the measures we are taking ;
(iv.) Propagandise the Arabic-speaking peoples as a whole with the one idea of
getting rid of the Turk ;
(v.) Give the King of Hejaz all the moral support we could as premier Arab and
initiator of the Arab movement, but carefully abstaining from forwarding
his claim to actual kingship over Arabs who do not desire his rule.
(vi.) Reorganise and re-staff the Arab Bureau and make it perform its functions
properly, which is the co-ordination of the whole of the Arab movement.
With regard to the last point, I need not say anything on the military side; on
the political side I submit that we ought to get America on the side of the Arabs, as a
people needing liberation. This, however, we cannot do until the President under
stands that by going to war with Turkey he is not entering into a tangle of Old-World
arrangements. It is for this reason that I strongly advocate an exchange of views in
the sense of Annex (B), which would clear us of all possible charges of Imperialism.
(Signed) ^ MARK SYKES.
Foreign Office, July 6 , 1918.
[ 3 5 — 110 ]
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