Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎98v] (196/544)

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Mr. Montagu asked whether the co-ordination ol Malieson’s and
Dunsterville’s activities necessarily involved ;t single commander.
He himself failed to see how General Marshall from Baghdad could
possibly deal conveniently and promptly with such situations as
might arise in Trans-Caspia.
The Chairman said he was rather inclined to agree with Mr.
Montagu.
Genera] Macdonogh pointed out that events in Trans-Caspia
reacted very swiftly on Krasnovodsk and across the Caspian, and for
this reason, among others, it Was desirable to have a single
command.
('The discussion was adjourned until the next meeting.)
The Chairman referred to a telegram from the G.O.C.,
Mesopotamia. No. X, 1351, 19th August (E.C.-1245), which he
had received just before the meeting, saying that it was reported by
Dunsterville that on the 16th instant there had been no change in
the situation at Baku ; that Bicharakov was apparently at Derbend,
whence he had telegraphed to Dunsterville that the Turks had
occupied Kizil Burun ; that the Bolsheviks were sending troops trom
Astrakhan to Baku to re-establish their rule ; that the Bolsheviks
had attacked Bicharakov at Derbend, but had been driven off; that
half the Derbend garrison had joined Bicharakov and the remainder
had withdrawn to Petrovsk ; and that Bicharakov himself proposed
to occupy Petrovsk, with a view to getting in touch with North
Caucasus and obtaining reinforcements to relieve Baku. Another
development hod come from the direction of Mughan, where there
was a Russian colony capable of providing 4.500 men trained to arms
and 10 guns, from whom Dunsterville thought that 3,000 good
fighting men might be available.
Lord Robert Cecil said that he had been informed by
M. Gennadius that a good Greek division, under Russian officers of
Greek extraction, was somewhere in the Caucasus, but he did not
know where. It was unfortunate that we could get no reliable news
at all about the movements of that most important factor, the
Caspian fleet.
General ISmuts s;dd that he gathered that one of the gunboats
had sided with us and pushed back the rest of the fleet, while
the other gunboat remained neutral.
Admiral Hope said the only information the Admiralty
had about the gun-boats was that one of them was neutral. A few
days previously. Commodore Norris had telegraphed that the first
party of twenty-eight officers and men, with one 4-inch gun and two
12-pounders, was due at Enzeli the following day ; that the Russian
Caspian fleet was working with us and was transporting troops in
Russian Government vessels; that hasty action in seizing ships
would certainly result in the removal of ali trooping facilities which he
could not replace at present ; and that ships would be taken over when
his men and guns were up and the situation was favourable. Com
modore Norris said that he fully understood the need of controlling
the Caspian and only awaited the means to do so. Seaplanes
capable of raiding Baku from Enzeli, also for coast flights, would be
most valuable and were preferable to aeroplanes. On the 19th
instant, Commodore Norris had sent a further message to the effect
that the first naval party of twenty-eight officers and men with
three guns ariived at Enzeli on the 14th August. The situation as
regards the Caspian fleet appeared to be unchanged and the Com
modore was leaving himself on the 16th instant for Baku. Admiral
Hope, proceeding, said that another party of 108 naval officers and
ratings with guns were somewhere on the road moving north, but
whether they were nearer Basra or Enzeli he could not say. He
was instructing Commodore Norris to keep him supplied with full
and frequent information about the fleet.