Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎124r] (247/544)

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5. The statement printed as an appendix to this Note shows the line that we
have taken with Bin Saud in the matter, and his own attitude towards our efforts to
promote reconciliation. The first question that arises is that of the yroyosed meeting
between the two Chiefs. King Husain has offered to visit his rival. Bin Saud
evidently regards the offer with suspicion, but is prepared to agree to a meeting on
certain conditions. Mr. Philby fears that a meeting might lead to eoniiict rather
than reconciliation, and ‘ k would on the whole recommend that visit be not
encouraged." Sir R. Wingate is strongly of opinion that a meeting between the
two principals “ could serve no useful purpose," and emphasises the objection of
withdrawing King Husain for any considerable period from the personal direction
of Hejaz affairs. He is more favourably inclined, however, to an alternative
suggestion made by the Foreign Office that an interview should be arranged between
one of the King’s sons and a brother of Bin Saud, and he is taking steps to sound
the King in the matter. The result of these steps may perhaps be awaited.
• 6. The second question is that of British representation with Bin Saud. The
Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, has warned us that the result of the refusal of His
Majesty’s Government to replace the 1,000 unserviceable Winchester riffes presented
to Bin Saud may be that Mr. Philby will find his position an impossible one, and
that he will be compelled to terminate his mission and leave for the coast. In a
subsequent telegram Captain Wilson has suggested that Mr. Philby, whom he
regards as having " reached the end of his tether," so far as his mission to Nejd is
concerned, should be allowed to proceed on leave, and should be replaced by an
officer from Egypt, whose deputation " would allay King Husain's suspicions and
put an end to the belief that our Arabian policies are not co-ordinated." In a still
later telegram, dealing with future British policy in Arabia as a whole. Captain
Wilson recommends that “ it should now be ruled that, though the affairs of Bin
Saud will continue to be dealt with by His Majesty’s Government through
Baghdad, henceforward any officer sent to Bin Saud will normally be a selection
of the High Commissioner, Cairo, who will be kept for the present fully informed of
all developments." Without prejudice to the question of a general ruling on the
lines advocated by the Civil Commissioner, the Department ventures to think that
there is much to be said for a change of representation with Bin Saud at the present
juncture. In the first place, as explained above, the policy vchich Mr. Philby was
sent to Riadh to carry out has been modified, and there seems advantage in making
the new departure synchronize with the appointment of a new agent. The latter
will be more favourably placed than our present representative, who is deeply
committed to the old policy, for giving effect to the revised instructions of His
Majesty’s Government. Secondly, much benefit might accrue from bringing a
“ new angle of vision " to bear upon the affairs of Bin Saud. There has been too
much of a tendency in the past for the two rival chieftains—Bin Saud and King
Husain—to find their respective champions in India and Egypt, and for the whole
controversy between them to be reflected in a conflict of view between the two
0 great administrations concerned. It is scarcely to be supposed that this aspect of
the case, or the possibility of turning it to advantage, is lost upon the chieftains
themselves. The appointment of an Egyptian officer to Riadh would do much to
correct these tendencies and to bring it home, both to Bin Saud and to the King.
« that there is unity in the counsels of His Majesty’s Government.
7. Thirdly, there remains the question of the 1,000 rifles. The Department is
most reluctant to revive a proposal on which the Eastern Committee has twice
recorded an adverse decision. But Captain Wilson is strongly of opinion that our
refusal to replace the unserviceable rifles may have very unfortunate consequences;
it will disgust Bin Saud and will alienate from him the sympathy of his adherents
who, even as it is, are “ by no means content with the results that have accrued from
his espousal of the British cause." The pressure of public opinion, as the Civil
Commissioner seems to hint, may even prove strong enough to override Bin Sand’s
loyalty to ourselves. Captain Wilson also reports that the General Officer Com
manding, Baghdad, agrees with him that the replacement of the 1,000 rifles is
“ expedient in present circumstances." Attention is drawn to General Marshall’s
view, because it was primarily on military grounds that the recent decision of His
Majesty’s Government was based. The arguments for and against the supply of the
rifles were discussed in a previous Memorandum circulated to the Committee and it
is not proposed to recapitulate them here. But it may he recalled that the pro
position, as supported by the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. , involved no increase of Bin Sand’s