Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎132r] (263/544)

3. The Committee resumed the discussion adjourned from
tne previous meeting (33rd meeting, minute 4), and had
before them the following papers:—K.C.-465, 501, 672, 1026,
1465, 1506, 1508, 1677, 1718, 1727, and 1765 (of which E.C. 465,
1718, 1727, and 1765 are printed as Appendix (B) ).
The Chairman said the question was, were the Committee in
favour of an alliance with Persia or not? It was clear that they
had never committed themselves definitely to such a policy. He
had been rather disturbed by a somewhat ambiguous telegram
which had been sent by the War Office to General Marshall,
No. 67118, dated the 25th September (E.C.-1703). The Director
of Military Operations, however, had informed him that the
statement in the telegram that it would be advantageous to us to
have Persia as an ally expressed the view of the War Office only,
and it was not intended to convey that of His Majesty’s Govern
ment. The Committee had now before them a telegram from
Cox, E.C.-1765, which was entirely against an alliance.
Mr. Montagu referred to certain pledges and promises which
had been made to Vossugh, and said that what he wished was
that Persia should come definitely on our side, in the same way
that America was on our side, although there was no formal
alliance. The Committee had already expressed their view that
this was desirable. There were three great advantages which
would accrue: (a) The effect on Afghanistan and India; (b) our
position in Persia would be regularised, and our position on the
Kasvin road and our maintenance of British forces in a neutral
country would be justifiable; and (c) we could turn out of Persia
all enemy agents, who were at present - a great source of embarrass
ment. As regards the objections raised by Cox, he did not see
why an alliance would involve us in any great outlay, as we
should tell Persia that we did not want her active military
co-operation. We already paid Starosselski's Cossacks and the
Bakhtiaris, and our control over them would certainly be
strengthened if we were allied with Persia. As regards possible
complications arising at the Peace Conference and extravagant
demands that Persia might make if she entered the war and con
sequently took part in the Conference, he himself did not share
Cox’s apprehension. He did not think Persia could really do
anv harm, nor would she be justified in expecting territory.
Lord Robert Cecil said that he agreed with Mr. Montagu,
and thought that the balance between the advantages and dis
advantages lay in favour of Persia’s co-belligerency. He thought
that it might" be unwise for us to continue to pay for a force
which was controlled by a Russian commander, and he himself
would prefer to see it commanded by a Persian or Franco-Swiss
officer. There could be hardly any doubt that both the Bakhtiaris
and Starosselski were only prevented by lack of money from
taking a much more prominent part in the politics of the country.
If weededded to invite Persia to come in as a co-belligerent, there
would be no need for us to make any definite promises, though we
might hint that we would do our best to recover Persian Azer
baijan. On the other hand, allies or co-belligerents were not
always an unmixed blessing, #.y., Portugal. He felt, however,
that it would be better in the circumstances for the Committee to
wait before coming to a decision, as it might be as well to see
what course Turkey intended to pursue.
General Smuts said one of the advantages of Portugal’s
alliance had been the ships it had brought to us. The question
now before the Committee declined in importance as the Turkish
menace receded. As regards our position in Persia, he thought
that this was perfectlv regular, so long as Turkish troops were
also there. He confessed that he rather shared Cox's apprehen
sion that Persia would demand an extravagant price for her
declaring war against Turkey. He agreed that it would be
wiser for the present to wait on events.