Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎157r] (313/544)

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APPENDIX I.
(E.C-2384.)
The South Persia Rifles : Position of Sir P. Sykes.
Note by India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. .
1. THE question of relieving Sir P. Sykes of the command of the South Persia
Rifles, which he has held since the creation of the force, was raised by the Government
of India (Foreign Department) in August last, when they expressed the view that
“in any case, the retention of General Sykes, whose policy we are at a loss to under
stand, is out of the question.” The War Office, in a letter dated the 29th August,
presumed “that the opportunity afforded by the readjustment of commands” (it was
then proposed to separate the command of the British troops at Shiraz from that of
the South Persia Rifles) “ will be taken to replace Sir P. Sykes by a junior officer (say
a lieutenant-colonel) as inspector.”
2. In a telegram to Lord Hardinge, dated the 31st August, Sir C. Marling criticised
adversely the manner in which Sir P. Sykes had conducted the operations against the
Kashgai during the earlier part of the summer. At the suggestion of the Foreign Office,
Sir C. Marling’s criticisms were communicated through the Government of India to
Sir P. Sykes, who was called upon to furnish a telegraphic report on the whole subject.
His report was transmitted with the Viceroy’s telegram of the 9th October, copies of
which have been circulated to the Committee. The Government of India (Army
Department), in transmitting the report, commented on Sir P. Sykes’ explanations as
follows: “ In view of the circumstances of the case, the quality of the troops at his
disposal, indefinite extent of the potential tribal opposition and the unreliability of the
South Persia Rifles, we consider the fact that Sykes succeeded in avoiding disaster
must be placed to his credit from the purely military point of view.” In other words,
they accept his explanations, and hold that his conduct of the operations was justified
in the circumstances. In this conclusion the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. concurs.
3. With regard to the general question of the South Persia Rifles, the position is
that Sir P. Cox was authorised by the Foreign Office on the 31st October last to assure
the Persian Government of our readiness to hand over the Shiraz contingent to the
Governor-General of Fars (Farman Farma) “ as soon as the two Governments are
satisfied that the Bushire-Shiraz trade route via Kazerun is open to traffic,
and the security and condition of the province generally, and the safety
of foreign representatives and interests are assured by Farman Farma’s
arrangements.” The offer is to be subject to the further reservation that His Majesty’s
Government shall have the right to be consulted before any future Governor-General
of Fars is appointed. According to Sir P. Cox’s original proposal Telegram No. 831,
of 23rd September, 1918), the transfer of the Shiraz contingent to Farman Farma was
to be made on a private understanding with the Persian Government that the
Governor General “ would himself ask and receive permission to retain adequate
number of British personnel to administer force,” but that “ such officers should not be
so senior (such as Sir P. Sykes or even Colonel Stokes) as to enable critics to say that
real control still remained British.” It is not quite clear from the correspondence
whether the condition as to British personnel still holds good ; but, even if it does, the
proposal eliminates Sir P. Sykes. It is not known whether Sir P. Cox has actually
approached the Persian Government in the matter.
4. In all the circumstances, the time appears to have come to reconsider the
question of Sir P. Sykes’ personal position. In the light of the Government of India’s
report it would be manifestly unfair to relieve him of his command in any manner that
could be held to imply censure or want of confidence. On the other hand, there is
little object in retaining him in a post which, if His Majesty’s Government hold to
their present policy, must shortly become extinct. Perhaps the best way out of the
difficulty would be to summon him to London, “for purposes of consultation.” His
absence from Shiraz will clearly facilitate the introduction of the new regime in the
South Persia Rifles, if it is to be introduced ; while his advice on the whole question
of the future maintenance of order in South Persia should be of the highest value to
His Majesty’s Government. 1 his proposal is not put forward with any object of
inviting His Majesty’s Government to reverse their decision as to the transfer o( the
South Persia Rifles. What Sir P. Sykes would be asked to discuss would be, not the
question (already answered adversely) of retaining the force in its present shape, but