Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎242v] (484/544)

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is to say, “ Very well, why then do you not leave her alone ? Why do you not let Persia
stew in her own juice ? Why not clear out if these people have no sense of order ? If
they are incapable of understanding the obligations of international loyalty and
friendship, why not leave them alone ? ” That is a very plausible and attractive view, but
it really is impracticable. We cannot for two reasons leave Persia to slip into ruin ;
first, because it would be absolutely fatal to her own future and prosperity and,
secondly, because it would be scarcely less dangerous to ourselves. Our interests in
Persia, which I need not elaborate because they are the commonplaces of this matter,
diplomatic, commercial, telegraphic—they cover a dozen different spheres—are too great
to allow us to treat Persia with lordly indifference. And observe this—that the
whole position has changed since the beginning of the war in the direction not of
reducing but of magnifying those interests. Hithet to Persia has been a country linked
with countries on our borders, Baluchistan and Afghanistan. Now we have gone into
Mesopotamia. We all of us realise that one inevitable result of the war will be that in
some form or another we shall remain in Mesopotamia. Therefore you will in future
have to face a double Indian frontier touching Persian soil, the Baluch and Afghan
frontier on the East, and the Mesopotamian frontier on the West. When I call it
Indian, I do not mean Indian as distinct from British, but I mean that our influence
there musi be predominant. Mesopotamia has become a British interest. I only call
it an Indian interest because it is in that part of the world. Therefore you have the
situation now that Persia, instead of being a solitary figure moving about in a chronic
state of disorder on the glacis of the Indian fortress, has the Indian frontier on one side
of her and what is tantamount to a British frontier on the other.
Another illustration of the degree to which the situation has changed in the way of
increase rather than reduction of our interests is what has happened in the war itself.
When the war began, when we used to sit at this table, if anybody had said to me that
we should eventually have to send our troops from Baghdad to Hamadon and from
Hamadan to the Caspian, 1 sh<*dd have looked upon that as ludicrous, and yet against
the will of every one of us we were compelled to take that step.
Thirdly, there is yet another condition which tends to the increase of our interests
and that is the position of the oilfields. I need not go into the whole question of the
oil, but you have only to consult the Admiralty to realise the enormous importance
which they attach to the oilfields in the region of the Karun.
All these considerations point to the conclusion which I venture to place before the
Committee, that our stake in Persia is a greater and not a less one in consequence of the
war.
That being so, what are the needs that we now must set before ourselves as regards
the future ? Firstly, we must insist upon maintaining there in whatever form (we will
come to the form in a moment) the general political predominance which is justified
and demanded by the interests I have described. Secondly, I imagine we must main
tain in some form or another the force known as the eastern cordon running up from
the Gulf in the south to Khorassan in the north and standing as a screen in front of our
frontier in Baluchistan and the Afghan frontier further to the north.
Thirdly, it is out of the question that, for the time being at any rate, we shall
give up the military line which we have been forced to take up on the road from Baghdad
via Kermanshah and Hamadan to the Caspian, and which—I attach great importance
to this—we are strengthening as rapidly as possible by means of a railway. We have
not time to discuss railways this afternoon. The railway policy in Peisia will have to
be carefully thought out; but whatever decisions are arrived at, the one that will meet
with universal assent is that that railway will have to be protracted and that it should
become one of the chief instruments both in ensuring the political security and
promoting the regeneration of Persia.
Fourthly, we are bound to keep up our position in the south because of our interests
in the Gulf and because of the trade routes that go from the Gulf into the interior.
Lastly, the financial sacrilices that we have made, and as far as I can see must
continue to make in Persia, must have some result. We really cannot continue to go
on pouring our millions into the abyss and getting nothing for them. We have
become so profligate in the war that we hardly think in millions now ; we almost think
in hillions. If anybody ill the Treasury were to draw up a record of what our Persian
policy, however infructuous in many ways it has been, has cost us in the last four years,
it would, I believe, stagger even those who sit at this table.
These seem to me to be the needs which we ought to bear in mind. What is
the method by which we can succeed in securing and enforcing them ? There is a general
recognition of the fact that Persia is too weak to stand alone, that she must have