Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎260v] (520/544)

last vestige of claims in this respect, and we hoped to have a draft agreement drawn up
that would involve that renunciation on their part. Nothing came of the discussion.
I am not aware that the agreement ever took substantial form, and it remains one o
the things to be arranged, if possible, between the French and ourselves. If 18 n<) t <l
matter which concerns the Peace Conference or anybody else, and in any readjnstmen
of the position with France in that quarter I have no doubt that our Foreign Office wi
press for the abandonment of that particular Declaration. ^
Turning round the coast of the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , we come to the group of chiefs known
as the Trucial Chiefs, our relations with whom sprang out of the conditions of pirany that
desolated the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. and interfered with trade and shipping there in the ear y
years of the nineteenth century. The trucial chiefs, half-a-dozen, I think, in number,
entered into agreements with us then to keep the peace and to refer disputes to our
arbitration, not to enter into relations with representatives of any foreign Powers, and
not to alienate or lease their territories or grant concessions, excepting with the consent
of Great Britain. Here, again, I hope we shall agree that these relations not only
must continue, but that they concern nob >dy but ourselves. 1 am going to raise later
on the question of how far—and it is really the important question we have to discuss
to-day—the position in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. and in the interior of Arabia ought to come
before the Conference at all, or, if it does come before them, what attitude we should
take up. I am only in passing, as I pursue my way round the circumference, dealing
with the particular chiefs concerned, and am arguing for the moment that whatever
relations we have had with them are matters that concern us and them and nobody
else.
To this group of trucial chiefs has been added since the war the chief of Fl-Katr,
on the western shores of the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. . This chief was a Turkish subject, and his
territory was regarded as part of the Turkish dominions until 1913, when, under the
arrangement with Turkey that was being discussed, but was never concluded at that
time, he was to pass out of Turkish suzerainty. That was in 1913. In 1916 a formal
agreement was made with him of the trucial type, so that from that date we may
count him as one more trucial chief—for that reason, he, too, may be dismissed from
further consideration.
Then in the hollow of the Gulf there lies Bahrein, the history of which is long and
chequered, because Bahrein is an island, or group of islands, to which claims have at
different times, and indeed at the same time, been put forward by Persia, Turkey, and
ourselves, and I believe there was actually one moment in history when all three flags
were dying over the fort in the harbour. When I went up the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. and
interviewed the then Sheikh, the position was this : he had practically acknowledged
the British protectorate, but no protectorate treaty had ever been concluded or has
been until this moment. At the same time, his position of dependence upon us was
defined to a greater degree than those of the smaller trucial chiefs in his neighbourhood
bv the fact that we had appointed a political officer there. r l hat officer, I believe, still
remains, and whether it is necessary or not to make a new arrangement with the Sheikh
of Bahrein after the war is a matter that, to pursue my argument, I think concerns us
and Bahrein alone, and does not concern the Powers or the Conference at all.
Then we come to Koweit. The first trouble that arose with Koweit was in 1899,
just after 1 had gone to India, and I sent up an officer who negotiated with him the
treaty of 1899, by which he first passed into our sphere. The danger that we then had
to face was the aggression of the Turks, who were moving down from the north into his
territory, which indeed they were partly threatening, partly attacking, and partly
holding, and we had to secure his fidelity to our cause. The then Sheikh, who has since
died, was a very strong personalitv. I remember when I went np the Gulf as Viceroy,
he gave me a great reception, and he was very proud of the relationship that had been
established between him and the Government of India, and to it from that date he remained
faithful to the hour of his death, which occurred during the last few years. His eldest
son, who succeeded him, was no good, and was presently succeeded by the second son,
who is now the ruling chief. Meanwhile, our relations with the State have been
cemented by a subsequent arrangement. In 1907, a fresh agreement was made with
the Sheikh of Koweit, arising out of the construction of the Baghdad Railway, and
the desirability of securing by agreement with him those harbours and places to which
it was possible that the railway, then in contemplation by the Germans and the Turks
in combination, might be brought. In the agreements that I was describing just now
that were made, or were in course of being made, with the Turkish Government by Lord
Grey before the war, the Sheikh of Koweit was left in an extraordinary position—
rather like that of Mahommed’s coffin. He was left half a Turk and half an ally of