'Seistan' [‎323v] (648/782)

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destiny. These conditions have already displayed a durability in excess of any
a 'priori expectations, and they may yet continue for a while, in the absence
of any startling change of environment, to survive. But they cannot, in the
nature of things, he permanent. A nation and a Government, such as the
Persian, may tremble for long upon the verge of certain dissolution, irom the
absence of the particular impulse that is required to propel them over the
brink. But in the last resort, and often by accident, the impetus is com
municated, and the already shattered structure tumbles into irretrievable ruin.
3 . We think that there are signs that such an issue, if not immediately
impending in Persia, is drawing near. The rule of the present Shah is distinctly
and uniformly weaker than that of his predecessor. Ihe dissolvent agencies
at work in the Persian kingdom are more active and persistent. Meanwhile,
the encroachments of B-ussian power are steadfastly pursued and are less veiled
by any pretence of concealment. Other Governments and nationalities, either
impelled by the secret obligations of international sympathies, or attracted by
a desire to share in the probable spoils, are appearing upon the scene; and
there is every reason to believe that, as in the case of the Ottoman Empire and
of China, so also here, the property of the sick man, should no steps be taken
in advance to prolong his existence, and should the end comp before any
testamentary dispositions have been made, is likely to be subject of bitter
contention between the various parties who may demand to be included among
his heirs.
4 . We desire, therefore, not merely to examine, in response to Your
Lordship’s invitation, the particular steps that may require to be taken for the
maintenance or extension of British interests in Persia at the present juncture,
but to survey a wider field, and, while there is yet time, to discuss how those
interests should be definitely safeguarded in the future that seems to be
imminent, and w r hat part in the outlay or in the measures that may be
necessitated for that end, should be assumed respectively by Her Majesty’s
Government and by the Government of India. Sir M. Durand himself
concludes his despatch by saying that “ the time has come for us to lay down
a definite line of policy”. We concur in this opinion, but we interpret the
obligation thus admitted in a broader sense than Her Majesty’s Minister has
done ; and we think that no mere stop-gap measures, however useful they may
individually be, will avail for the permanent protection of our position in
Persia, unless a clear understanding be arrived at in advance as to what that
position is and what it demands.
5. It may not be inappropriate to state, in the first place, what we
conceive British, Anglo-Indian, interests in Persia to be. They are com
mercial, political, strategical and telegraphic. The total annual value of
British trade with Persia has been estimated by Sir M. Durand (and, from the
calculations that we have made, we believe the estimate to be below the mark)
as approximately three and-a-half millions sterling; and while a great deal of
this trade, particularly in the south and east, is with British India, yet the
northern and western avenues of entry are devoted in the main to commercial
connections with the British Isles. The total volume of Anglo-Persian trade
continues, in spite of the difficulties encountered and the increasing insecurity
in Persia, to rise and, under a more efficient and less venal regime, would
probably attain to much larger dimensions. Similarly, although the experience
of the past decade has not been encouraging to British mercantile investment
in Persia, as the experience of the Tobacco Begie, the Persian Mining Bights
Company, and other ventures, has shown, there is nevertheless a good deal of
British capital sunk in various industrial undertakings in different parts of the
country.
6 . The political interests of Great Britain in Persia, although they date
originally from a period before India had become a British interest at all, were,
in the main Indian in inception, and are still
largely Indian in character. It would be unfair, however, at the present day to