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as distinct from a Persian, port that would presently be converted not merely
into a coaling station but into a fortified naval base on the Indian Ocean.
Such of the advocates to whom I have alluded as at all realise this conception
defend it upon the following grounds :—
4. It is said that ports do not give sea-power, and that a Russian port in
the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. would in nowise add to her strength, because she has no
fleet adequate to defend it. This might be true as long as Russia consented to
remain solely or mainly a land-power. But the answer is clear that Russia has
no fleet (or iittle to speak of) only because she has few ports ; and that as soon
as her maritime outlets are secured and fortified, the fleet will follow with no
delay and in proportionate strength. If we project our gaze for only a short
distance into the future, and contemplate the time when Russia will have
secured the free passage of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, when she will
have obtained a naval station somewhere in the Red Sea, when a coaling station
will have been conceded to her in Siamese waters, when her position in Man
churia has been firmly established, and when its maritime outlets at Talienwan
and Port Arthur, if not in a Korean harbour or island as well, have been fully
developed (none of these being far-fetched or extravagant hypotheses)—still
more if a naval base in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. he added to their number—can any
one doubt that the fleet would promptly he forthcoming, or that Russia would
emerge as one of the great naval powers of the future ?
5. Secondly, it is contended that a Russian port and trade in the Indian
Ocean would be absolutely at the mercy of the British fleet. This of course
depends in the main upon the strength of our naval resources in Eastern waters
as compared with those which Russia would maintain. The balance is at present
entirely in one direction. That it would long remain so is open to grave
doubt. But this plea rests upon a further double misconception which in spite,
or perhaps in consequence, of its extraordinary popularity it is necessary
to expose. It postulates that the naval base, once secured, would be left
unfortified and open to attack. The precedent of Port Arthur does not
encourage this amiable illusion. Just as, by the expenditure of millions of
roubles, that naval station has, in a surprisingly short time, been rendered
practically invulnerable to maritime attack (the same might be said at an
earlier stage of Batum and Vladivostok), so would a naval base in the Persian
Gulf be similarly treated.
6. .Next, the argument under examination entirely ignores what will
happen in the long years of peace, and assumes only what way happen on the
rare occasion of war. It is easy to say that were Russia to acquire a Gulf
port, and to create a mercantile navy and a fighting fleet, all three would he
at our mercy, should war he declared. But supposing there were no war, what
then ? In ten years of peace, there would most unquestionably have been built
up a position by land and sea which would be immune from any attack
that we might direct against it: and we should no more direct our energies
against Russia in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , than, if war were declared to-morrow°we
should try to bombard Cronstadt or to effect a landing at Vladivostok.
7. Thirdly, the familiar, plea is urged that if only we were to come to
terms with Russia about Persia by which is meant the complete surrender
to Russian aims there would be an end to Anglo-Russian rivalry in Asia
and that the two nations might sit down together to work out the reclamation
of the East. I regret to confess that this plea appears to me equally
untenable. The plan has been too often tried and found wanting It used
to be said that, if Russia were allowed her way at Constantinople, she would cease
to be a menace to Great Britain in Central Asia. Will any one now contend
that if Constantinople were given to her to-morrow, she won]d tear up her Kush k
Kailway, or surrender her ambitions as regards Herat and Kashgar i 1 Onlv a
few years ago the same plea was urged in China—“ Let B ussia but have a
port m ice-lree waters, and we shall hear no more of Russian rivalry at
Peking . I doubt if any one who has passed through the recent Chinese war
will now endorse that theory. Ihe cession of Port Arthur to Russia was the