Notes Prepared for Reference during Curzon’s Tour of the Persian Gulf, and Other Papers on Persia and the Persian Gulf [‎80v] (160/678)

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( 2 )
The extent of action open to us was held to be limited by the following conditions :
We have no troops available for the effective occupation of Persian territory, or even
of any large number of Persian ports; and it is by troops and not by ships that positions on
the sea-coast must be held. _ _ ...
We should run the risk of creating a most unfavourable impression upon India it we
occupied any ports or districts from which we might probably be forced to retire, eiiher in
view 1 of an impending collision with Kussia, or subsequently to an outbreak of hostilities.
(iiil Whatever steps we might take should be such as to involve as little as possible the
risk of further complications by the intervention of other foreign Powers in any temporary
measures taken to preserve order in Persia.
The conclusion arrived at was that, in the contingency above mentioned, of a Russian
occupation in the north, we should atome occupy Bandar Abbas, and the three islands of
Ormuz Kishm and Han jam; that we should protect and watch British interests at Bus hire ;
that we should occupy, or be prepared to occupy, Seistan, with an adequate force of troops from
India • and that our ships of war should pay visits to other ports and islands in the Hult. but
it was held that no other occupation of territory or operations inland should be attempted.
3. The third question was :—
“In what particular portions of Persia and by what methods can the extension of British
influence be most successfully prosecuted and to the best advantage for general purposes, and
for the contingencies mentioned in questions (1) and (2).’'’
The answer to this question was determined by what had been settled on. the preceding
Questions. We should, it was thought, steadily prepare for an occupation of Seistan by extend
ing the railway beyond Nushki and pushing our trade.. We should reassert our claims at
Bassidore and in the Mosandim promontory, especially in the Elphinstone Inlet, and revert to
the juris diction of the Chief of Shargah over the coast from Dibba to Khor Kalba. All
possible care should be taken to prevent any other Power from gaining a footing at Bandar
Abbas or on any one of the neighbouring islands. For the rest, we should continue to en courage
trade on the Karun, to maintain our position at Bushire, and to support Persia as long as
possible by peaceful means. The extension of telegraphs under British management was also
indicated as a desirable measure.
As regards railways, Sir W. Nicholson stated that a railway from Bandar.Abbas or
Charbar to Ispahan would be to our advantage if we had troops available to guard it in time of
war. But as we had not, the opening up of these routes would merely provide the Russians
with increased facilities for getting to the Southern Coast.
Prince Louis of Battenberg explained that the establishment of a Russian coal depot, at
Charbar might be a convenience for their cruisers and transports going to the Far East, in time
of peace, but had no serious significance in case of war, so long as it was not fortified and
provided with communications by land with a Russian base.
It was ao-reed that in reality the most effective check to Russian progress towards . South
Persia lay in the completion of the railway from Constantinople to Bagdad, as it would bring the
Turks in force on the flank of a Russian advance, and that it would be a great mistake to. oppose
the project, which we ought on the contrary to encourage to the best of our power, provided' we
can acquire our proper share in the control of the radway and of its outlet on the Persian Cult.
It was understood that the discussion was to be limited to the subjects of the terms of
reference; and the larger questions, (1) whether there was any action on the part of Russia in
respect of Persia which might be held to constitute a casus belli, and (2) whether any agree
ment with Russia as to Persia was desirable or possible, were not raised.
(Signed) LOUIS BATTENBERG,
L.N.I.
St. G. B. ARMSTRONG,
Captain, U.M.L.I.
T. H. SANDERSON.
ARTHUR GODLEY.
•WILLIAM LEE-WARNER.
W. G. NICHOLSON,
L.G.MJ.
E. A. ALTHAM, A Q.M.G.