Notes Prepared for Reference during Curzon’s Tour of the Persian Gulf, and Other Papers on Persia and the Persian Gulf [‎145v] (290/678)

12
Roads and Rail
ways.
Rivers.
Strategical position.
The principal roads from Baghdad are the post-road northwards to Mosul
and thence to Diarbekir to the Mediterranean, the road by the Euphrates
Valiev to Aleppo and Damascus, which is described below, and the great
pilgrim route from Persia through Khanikin and on to Karbala. 1 he question
of the construction of railways from Khamkm to Baghdad and from Baghdad
to Karbala has often been discussed, though nothing has ever been done, and
lately a good deal of interest has been roused by the concession granted to 1 VL
Moral, a German subject, for the construction of a cart-road from Tehran through
Khanikin to Baghdad, and the right to establish a service of carriages along the
road. Beyond the preliminary enquiries no steps have been taken towards the
actual carrying out of this project, and nothing will be done before the autumn
of this year, when M. Moral expects to return. It is even doubtful whether the
syndicate, which he represents, has actually got the capital necessary or whether
they have still to raise it. The general opinion appears to be that the success
of the undertaking as a commercial speculation is at least doubtful. It would to
a very great extent be dependent on pilgrim traffic, and this is always uncertain
as, in case of an outbreak of cholera or other disease, the Turkish authorities
might at any time refuse to allow pilgrims into the country. The class of which
most of the pilgrims are composed have also a great objection to paying tolls
or road-dues, if they can possibly avoid it, and the extent to which they would
make use of the road would, in a great degree, depend on the amount of security
from robbery, official and otherwise, which the concessionaire could obtain.
As regards railways it is thought that a Baghdad-Karbala line, entirely de^
pendent on pilgrim traffic, would not pay well, though possibly a line from Khani
kin to Baghdad might do so.
Another important line of communication, or one that might easily be made
so, is the river Tigris above Baghdad to Mosul. The only bar to navigation
at present is the presence in the river of ledges of rock or masonry (it is doubt
ful whether they are natural or artificial), which extend across the bed in several
places, and which steamers can only cross when the river is at its highest. It is
estimated that these obstructions could be removed and the river made navigable
for the whole distance between Mosul and Baghdad for an expenditure of only
£ T. 60,000, but in the present state of affairs there is little likelihood of any
thing being done. At present a good deal of merchandise is floated down stream
from Mosul on rafts.
Strategically the position of Baghdad is somewhat weak ; the town is en
tirely undefended, and an army holding it would always be liable to surprise from
the direction of Mosul, where the river would form an excellent line of communi
cation. In fact Mosul appears to be the strategic key to Mesopotamia and the
valley of the Shatt-ul-Arab, and any power holding it would dominate this country.
What the provinces of Baghdad and Basra might develop into in the hands
of a civilised power, it is difficult to say, but with a proper system of canals and
irrigation works which would carry the surplus water over the country and so
prevent the disastrous floods which now so frequently occur, nothing but popu
lation would be required to render it one of the most fertile districts in the world.
If England were that power, the population might be supplied from the over
crowded plains of India. Already we have a very large number of subjects who
have emigrated to the holy places of the Shiah religion in the country, and this,
to Muhammadans at least, would offer an inducement to emigration which no
other countries possess.