File 4535/1928 Pt 8 ‘ – PERSIAN GULF – QUESTION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF PROTECTORATES OVER KOWEIT, BAHREIN, MUSCAT, TRUCIAL COAST.’ [‎67v] (128/194)

10
Loi\ i, 417-!).
Lor. i, 481-91.
Lor. i, 504, 519, 537.
* Tel. from Viceroy
to S. of S. for I.,
Aug. 3 1913,
P. 3134/13.
t Cf. P. 3744/lO.
Political Report to
Pol. Res., May 9
1917, P. 370/18.
X Tel. to Viceroy,
July 10 1913,
P. 2749.
§ P. 4022-23/15.
|| P. 3792/15,
P. 3744/10
IV,—Relations between the Sultan of Muscat and Oman and the Ibadhi
Tribes of Oman. The Oman Rebellion, 1913-21.
43. Up to 1733 the capital of Muscat and Oman was at Rastaq in the
interior. Up to 1793 the temporal ruler, who was also the spiritual ruler of
the country, had, in accordance with the tenets of the Ibadhi sect oi Islam, f
been elected by the people. The transfer of the capital to the coast of
Muscat relieved the fanatical tribes of the interior of the direct control to
which they had hitherto been subject, while the fact that from the usurpation
of Saiyid Sultan in 1793 the formality of election had been dispensed with,
enabled them to regard their nominal ruler as a usurper. The relations
with heretical foreign Powers which followed the transfer of the capital and
the progressive degeneration in the capacity of the ruling house by which
that transfer was accompanied, further weakened the position of the Sultan
vis-a-vis the Omani tribes; and a series of rebellions between 18^9 and 1867
culminated in the temporary seizure of power (1868-71) by a representative
of a younger branch of the ruling family supported by the tribes.
44. The usurper was overthrown in 1871 by the legitimate branch; but
between that date and 1913 numerous attempts were made by the Omani
tribes to dethrone the Sultans, whose survival as rulers may fairly be said
to have been due solely to the support of His Majesty’s Government. In
the years immediately before the war, tribal feeling was inflamed by the
stoppage of the importation of arms, 0 following on the suppression of the
slave trade, both of them measures permitted by Islam, at the instigation
of Christian Powers; a carefully organised conspiracy followed, and in
May 1913, in an outburst of religious fanaticism, the Omani tribes arose in
rebellion.!
45. Reinforcements were despatched by His Majesty’s Government in
fulfilment of a guarantee given to the Sultan in 1895, and then communicated
to the Sheikhs of Oman, that they would not allow attacks to be made on
Muscat or Muttrah whatever differences the Sultan might have with his
tribes—a guarantee, the principle of which was extended in practice to the
ports of the Batinah coast and to Kuryet, which contained resident British
subjects. The warning in question was renewed, with the approval of His
Majesty’s Government,! but produced no impression on the Omanis, and
while in January 1915 the crushing defeat of an attack in force on the
British outposts stationed at Bait-el-Falaj for the protection of Muscat and
Mattrah taught the tribes their lesson, by 1916 the rebels had obtained
complete control of all Oman proper, and had organised a Government in it;
and they remained thereafter in undisputed possession of the interior, and a
constant menace to the coast towns. These the} 7 would probably have taken
had it not been for the British garrison at Bait-ei-Falaj and the knowledge
that the arrival of one of His Majesty’s ships would quickly have forced
them to relinquish any hold which they might temporarily have established.
46. Thanks to the efforts of the Political Agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. , a conference to consider
terms of peace between the Sultan and the Imam of the Omani tribes took
place at Sib on the 15th September 1915. It was completely abortive,§
the demands of the Sultan that the Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. Samail and its forts (captured in
August 1913, and essential to the commercial prosperity of Muscat)|| should
be returned to him, and his temporal supremacy in Oman recognised, being
categorically refused by the Omanis, who demanded on their part that the
Sultan should reform his Government according to their ideas, that their
financial claims should be settled in full, and that the free purchase of arms
and ammunition should be allowed. No reconciliation proved possible, and
the negotiations were broken off.
47. From the breaking off of the negotiations in September 1915, no
further steps w T ere taken towards a settlement until March 1918. The
Imam consolidated his power in the interior, while the Sultan’s Government,
according to the Political Agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. , “ became involved in hopeless debt and
reached an unparalleled degree of ineptitude.”
48. Further abortive negotiations took place in March 1918, but there
was no substantial advance until the following year. At the beginning of