File 4535/1928 Pt 8 ‘ – PERSIAN GULF – QUESTION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF PROTECTORATES OVER KOWEIT, BAHREIN, MUSCAT, TRUCIAL COAST.’ [‎92v] (178/194)

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Sheikh Isa, though he agreed to the right of protection in the case of other
foreigners, maintained his own right over Nejdis.
In 1917 the political agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. suggested we might fall in with this view of the sheikh
as a graceful concession, and this appears to nave been acted on unofficially up to
1920 - . ^ ^
21. Except as above, the internal affairs of Bahrein do not appear to have
attracted much attention until the end of the Great War.
The political agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. found himself powerless to prevent the many gross tyrannies
which were being perpetrated, but used his influence as far as he could to prevent
certain abuses.
In 1908 the political agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. attempted to improve trade conditions, and in 1J10
he reported that the utmost patience had been exercised in order to get the sheikh to
agree without coercion to some compromise to meet the requirements of traders with
regard to landing arrangements, which he leased as a monopoly.
22. In 1911 the political resident A senior ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul General) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Residency. again gave a gloomy picture of the condition
of the Bahrein principality due to the incompetence of Sheikh Isa. i -i i
He said that all progress was hampered by the bigoted incapacity of the sheikh,
to which was to be added the nationalist sentiment which had agitated Islam during
the past two or three years. He was of the opinion that Government would have to
interfere in the interests of our shipping.
In 1912 the Government of India called upon the sheikh to form a suitable
scheme for the landing of cargo, a reform which was suitably carried through.
23. On the outbreak of war the attitude of the sheikh and his two sons was
friendly, but the inhabitants of Bahrein were, perhaps naturally, affected by their
Islamic sentiment. . .
The arrest of Wonckhaus agent and the capture of Basra had a quieting effect.
During the war internal affairs necessarily received little attention.
In 1912 Sheikh Isa agreed to the erection of a wireless station in Bahrein, and
in 1916, on the departure of the sheikh's quarantine officer on leave, we took over the
quarantine duties of the place, a duty wffiich we have continued to perform.
In 1915 Sheikh Isa was invested with C.S.I., and in 1919 with the K.C.I.E.
24. In May 1919 Captain Bray, who had been for six months political agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. ,
accompanied Sheikh Isa's second son, Sheikh Abdulla, to England.
Captain Bray considered that there was some anti-British feeling in Bahrein,
that there was no British party, and he considered the activities of the American
missionaries to be anti-British. While this is not the case directly, indirectly it must
necessarily be so.
25. Captain Bray, the first of a series of officers from Iraq, was very much in
favour of an up-to-date Bahrein, with water works, electric power, industrial schools,
pearl button manufactures, &c. i
The deputy resident, Mr. Hill, was not, however, m favour of these improve
ments, preferring rather to leave the Arab to develop slowly than to inculcate in
him a divine discontent.
26. Six months later Major Dickson reported
(1.) Political situation wholly unsatisfactory.
(2.) Strong, long-standing and deep-seated anti-British sentiment.
(3.) British prestige rests on fear and not on respect.
He also stated that Sheikh Isa was a very old and weak man, with sincere
feelings of friendship for His Majesty's Government, but easily swayed and confused
in his judgment by astute minds and intrigues, dictated for the most part by inten
tions evil to him and'to us. It is amusing to note that as far back as 1898-99 Colonel
Meade referred to Sheikh Isa as a very old man with a weak character.
About the same time Government interfered in a difference between Sheikh Isa
and Ibn Saud regarding the duties to be charged on goods proceeding to Hasa.
Sheikh Isa was compelled to accept 2 per cent, duty, much to his chagrin, as he
considered Government had favoured Ibn Saud at his expense.
27 In the meantime, Sheikh Abdulla had visited England and had an
interview with Sir Arthur Hertzel, which was illuminating with regard to the
sheikh’s feelings.
Sheikh Abdulla asked that—
(1) Sheikh Isa should be put on an equality with neighbouring Arab rulers m
the exercise of authority over all persons except subjects of Great
Britain and the Great European Powers (i.e., Nejdis and Persians, &c.).