File 4535/1928 Pt 8 ‘ – PERSIAN GULF – QUESTION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF PROTECTORATES OVER KOWEIT, BAHREIN, MUSCAT, TRUCIAL COAST.’ [‎93v] (180/194)

33. On the 7th December, 1922, the Foreign Office, London, informed the India
Odice that they desired to express their earnest hope that steps might be taken
forthwith for the introduction at Bahrein of reforms tending to ensure the equitable
treatment of Shiahs.
My hies do not show it, but I understand that Shiah pressure was being exercised
through the Persian Government at Tehran.
Colonel Knox, who was Acting Resident in 1923 at the time the reforms were
finally put through, was not in favour of our pressing reforms on Sheikh Isa, as he
considered the Persian challenge was directed not against our conduct of affairs in
Bahrein but against our position there, and that reforms would not placate Persia
but would provoke the larger issue. He pointed out in this reference that if we
withdrew from Bahrein it would not be Persia but the Wahabis who would
succeed us.
34. In January 1923 Major Daly reported that Sheikh Isa was purely
obstructive in matters to the advantage of the State, and amongst them would never
agree to the exploration for oil except under pressure.
Colonel Trevor then reported that the state of affairs in Bahrein called for
reform more urgently than ever.
35. On the 17th April, 1923, the Government of India wired to London urging
reforms, since misrule had reached such a pitch, but said : “In the present temper
of Islam we are anxious to use every endeavour to induce Sheikh Isa to act ostensibly
in his own interest and wish to avoid overt intimidation .... failing that, if it
means his enforced retirement and deportation of Sheikh Abdulla we are determined
to carry out the reforms ourselves .... such action would almost certainly force
the general issue of our status in Bahrein, and might produce an unfavourable
reaction on Ibn Saud, but we presume His Majesty's Government are prepared to
face the consequences.”
In reply, the Secretary of State gave the required authority to convey a
categorical warning to Sheikh Isa.
36. A further disturbance between some Nejdis and Persians took place in
which five people were killed, which assisted Colonel Knox when on the 15th May,
1923, he crossed to Bahrein to take action.
He stated Sheikh Hamad's great fear was of Ibn Saud; and he reported his
own anticipation that the whole management of affairs would more and more come
into the hands of the political agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. .
37. On the 20th May Colonel Knox had an interview with Sheikh Isa. He
told him that the Government were much concerned at the condition in Bahrein,
and that we were committed to a serious course of reforms, and advised him to stand
aside and give Sheikh Hamad a free hand.
Sheikh Isa was obdurate, and on the 23rd May Colonel Knox asked Sheikh
Hamad and Sheikh Abdulla to make one last effort to induce Sheikh Isa to agree to
his measures.
On the 26th May Sheikh Isa was set aside, as far as control over matters was
concerned, and his son Hamad appointed to rule for him.
Sheikh Hamad, though well-meaning, was without experience, and had the
weak character of his father, though perhaps without so much obstinacy.
Consequently, for the next four years he took no step without the help or, indeed,
advice of the political agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. , and his complete lack of initiative forced Major Daly
into the foreground.
38. In June 1923 the Government of India wrote the first of their repeated
warnings that the political agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. must be on his guard against being tempted to
interfere too much and too directly in the sheikh’s affairs or to become the
administrative officer rather than the adviser.
Colonel Knox pointed out that to evolve order out of chaos steps had to be taken,
and that both Sheikh Hamad and Major Daly were in bad odour in consequence of
the reforms having been established.
39. Sheikh Isa then appealed to the High Commissioner at Bagdad.
The Sunni tribes were* opposed to these reforms, and in November 1923
petitioned Colonel Trevor on his return to the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. .
On the other hand, Sheikh Hamad and Sheikh Abdulla asked Colonel Trevor
if he would permanently appoint a British customs director for Bahrein. Colonel
Trevor supported their request, and also recommended the raising of a small force
of Baluchis to maintain order, along with other local reforms, such as law courts, &c.
Colonel Trevor pointed out this would entail the employment of three British
officers, and that without them the reforms could not be carried out.