'MISCELLANEOUS. PERSIA 1882-1898: Maps, Government Papers etc.' [‎7v] (14/202)

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other Princes made a move in Tehran, and if we
were to stand aloof. Can there be any objection to
Sir N. O’Conor mentioning to Prince Lobanow in
the course of a friendly conversation about Persia,
our willingness to co-operate with Russia in the
event of the death of the Shah, or to our Minister
at Tehran receiving general instructions which would
enable him to act should the emergency occur?
It might even be well for the British Consul at
Tabriz to accompany the new Shah in such a case,
as the Russian would almost certainly do on his
own account.
2. But there is another point on which Sir M.
Durand.is all but silent. If the Valiahd dies, as is
very likely, before his father (he has Bright’s
disease), who is to be the heir? The Zil-es-Sultan
is treacherous and brutal, though crafty and
resolute. The Naib-es-Sultaneh is cowardly and
incompetent. They hate each other, and each
might endeavour to strike for the throne. But the
Valiahd has a son, already grown up, whom I have
heard favourably spoken of. In an analogous case
earlier in the century when Abbas Mirza, who was
Crown Prince, died in 1833, his elder son became
heir-apparent in his place, and succeeded his grand
father, Fath Ali Shah, a little later. Could not
Sir M. Durand ascertain something about this
young man—his character and inclinations, his
position at Court, the views of the Shah about
him, the chances of his being appointed Valiahd if
his father dies, the probable attitude towards him of
Russia, See. ? The Sadr-Azam would never back the
Zil. Would he join the Valiahd’s son, or would he
side with the Naib ?
3. Upon the question of a renewal of the old
assurance by Russia of a guarantee of Persian
integrity and independence, it may be worth while
to sound the Russian Government again. I can
not imagine that they will return a favourable
reply. They shirked giving an answer in 1893,
and they will probably repeat that attitude. Such
a refusal or evasion might, however, give us the
opportunity for making the statement to which I
next turn.
4. I agree with Sir M. Durand as to the advisa
bility of intimating to the Russian Government that
any aggressive movement on their part in North
Persia would probably lead to some counter dis
positions by Great Britain in South Persia. There
is no necessity to bind ourselves to take the Gulf
ports, or to occupy any territory, or indeed, to