'Minutes memos despatches etc' [‎29v] (58/156)

2
Charles Marling that announcements of any kind were perfectly useless and that
nothing we could say or do would have any effect on Persian public opinion. A\ ith
all deference to Sir Charles Marling’s intimate personal knowledge of Persia, I venture
to submit that botli his own and Sir Percy Cox’s telegrams have repeatedly indicated
that there is a very real volume of public opinion in Persia which is strong enough to
upset Governments and without the support of which no Prime Minister can hold his
own very long. Now, if there is public opinion of such an important character in
Persia, it must obviously be subject to ordinary influences, and I maintain that if we
only make an effort we can get that public opinion on our side. I .am under no
delusions as to the general meanness and futility of the Persian character, but there
is undoubtedly, as Sir Charles Marling himself admitted yesterday, a curious kind of
patriotism or nationalism which is neither to be bought nor overawed. It is, perhaps,
akin to the political enthusiasm that braces the Bengali seditionist to walk bravely to
the gallows, but whatever may be its psychology this feeling exists, and we must
allow for it. As regards Lord Curzon’s criticism that we have practically done
everything that I suggested yesterday, while fully admitting the accuracy of this, 1
would venture to suggest that the manner in which our various announcements and
guarantees have been made has not been of a very convincing or ingratiating kind.
There has been a want, if I may say so, of real frankness and kindliness about the
tone of our communications to the Persian Government: In the words of the old song,
“ It’s not exactly what we say but the nasty way we say it.”
7. I would suggest, therefore, that we should in the most public manner make a
Declaration to the Persian Government in the following sense :—
“ The exigencies of the war and circumstances arising from it with, which the
Persian Government were unfortunately unable themselves to deal adequately,
have compelled His Majesty’s Government, during the last four years,
reluctantly to take action in Persia which has not unnaturally aroused
suspicion as to our intentions in regard to that country. Now tfiat the war
has been successfully terminated in our favour. His Majesty’s Government
are anxious to regain the confidence of the Persian people, and to prove the
sincerity of their oft-repeated Declarations that the independence and
integrity of Persia are their desire, and that they sincerely wish to have as
their neighbour in the East a friendly and prosperous Persia. To this end
His Majesty’s Government desire it to be known that during the period of
the war they have rendered substantial financial assistance to the Persian
Government (this might be elaborated in detail), and refrained from
demanding the repayment of large and overdue debts ; they have made it a
cardinal point in the Peace negotiations that Turkey should surrender every
inch of Persian territory occupied by them ; in deference to public opinion
they have agreed to abolish the South Persia Rifles in Pars and to make
them over to the Persian Government to form a part of such uniform army
as hereafter may be raised in Persia ; they have further agreed to withdraw
their troops from Ears as soon as order has been restored on the Bushire-
Shiraz road, and hope shortly to give effect to this promise. Further,
His Majesty’s Government have now decided finally to abrogate the 1907
agreement with Russia; to consider the revision of the Persian customs
tariff at an early opportunity; to remove their troops from other parts of
Persia as soon as circumstances, which include the safeguarding of the
Persian frontier on the north and the rendition of territory recently occupied
by the lurks permit, and finally to continue to the Persian Government f( r
the time being such subvention as may be suitable to enable them to carry
on the government of the country and restore reasonable law and order. In
return al l th at His Majesty’s Government ask of the Persian Government is
that tli^jL will accept the assistance of British financial advisers in the
regulation of their finances. As heavy creditors of the Persian Government,
and in view of the subvention now promised, His Majesty’s Government fe< 1
sure that the Persian people will recognise the reasonableness of this
demand, which is not intended in any way to infringe the sovereign rights
or liberties of Persia. Indeed, without some safeguard of this kind
His Majesty’s Government would obviously not be justified either in
continuing a subvention or in postponing further their claim to the
repayment of their just debts. Furthermore, His Majesty’s Government