'Minutes memos despatches etc' [‎31r] (61/156)

[This Ducunient is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]
CONFIDENTIAL.
. /q/i
c-ir I\ Cox’s tele-
trramK, Nos. 981,
9*5, 1008,and
1086 < f the 18th,
20 th, 26th Norem-
her and 81 h l^e-
■cemher 191*, and
Foreign Office
telegrams to Sir
P. Cox, Nos. 620
<i26, and 630 of the
27 1 h Nc vein her
and 3rd December.
MEMORANDUM REGARDING THE POLICY OF
HIS MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT TOWARDS
PERSIA AT THE PEACE CONFERENCE.
Introduction.
The policy of His Majesty's Government at the
Peace Conference is understood to aim, as far as pos
sible, at excluding Persia as a non-belligerent from all
discussion, with a view to keeping our hands free to
settle our post-war policy diractly with the Persian
Government without any mandate from other Powers
at the Conference, and without the necessity, as hereto
fore, of framing our policy to meet Russian views. The
French Government are understood to share this view.
Apart from the merits of this policy, which are dis
cussed below, and apart from the legal or moral merits
of Persia’s case for participation at the Conference, it
appears necessary k> be prepared with alternatives in
case events have gone too far to permit of such a policy
being successfully pursued at the Conference. Whether
on Persian or American initiative, the idea of Persia’s
representation has, in fact, for some time past been
discussed at Teheran; and a mission has now actually
been appointed, headed by the present Minister for
Foreign Affairs; while the Persian Government have
sent in circular to Foreign Ministers at Teheran a list
of their general desiderata, which included the demand
for Persian official representation at the Peace Con
ference, and “ undertakings from the signatories of
peace ensuring Persia’s status in the future.” The
Persian Minister in London has also mentioned such
desiderata in conversation here. His Majesty's
Government have, indeed, pointed out to Sir P. Cox
that the representation of Persia, as that of other non
belligerents at the Peace Conference, can only be
settled by the Conference itself, and have instructed
him to discourage, as far as possible, any further dis
cussions of the Persian Government’s claims, and to
confine himself in any case to informing the Persian
Government that His Majesty’s Government would
consider sympathetically any reasonably concrete pro
posals which Persia may eventually put forward at
the Conference. At the same time, Sir P. Cox was
authorised to tell the Persian Prime Minister, for his
personal information, in reply to an enquiry by
Vossugh ed Dowleh when it was understood that the
Shah might select him as Persian representative, that
His Majesty’s Government would he “ particularly
glad to see him at the Conference.”
It is clear, therefore, that His Majesty’s Govern
ment must be prepared for the eventualitv of the ques
tion of Persia arising directly or indirectly at the
Conference: and once it does so it may be difficult to
limit the discussion. Indeed, the inclusion by the
Persian Government in their vague desiderata of
every question from political independence and fron
tiers to economic concessions and capitulations, indi
cates how r discussions, once started, may be extended.
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