'Minutes memos despatches etc' [‎32v] (64/156)

to be given by one or many Powers, by America or
Great Britain. In any case in the interests of civilisa
tion and international comity alone Persia can hardly
be allowed to refuse to adopt tire only alternative course
to internal chaos.
If therefore from every point of view, British,
Persian and international, it is clear that foreign
assistance to Persia must be continued, British policy
towards Persia at the Peace Conference should be
framed on that basis. The following five courses then
appear open to us:
I. —We might endeavour to induce the Conference to
shelve the whole question of Persia with the object,
as apparently desired by the Government of India (sec
Viceroy’s telegram of the 26th November, 1918, to the
India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. ) of fostering the reformation of Persia.-
primarily by ourselves with the minimum of effort and
expenditure and with no mandate either from Persia
* or other Powers. Apart from the practical difficulty
of persuading the Conference to adopt such an
attitude, when once the Persian question has been
raised at the Conference, such a policy seems most
undesirable for the reason that we should not only tend
to bear in Persia the whole onus of Russian un
popularity as the heirs of the policy of the Anglo-
Russian Convention, but also that we should have done
nothing to meet international criticism of a con
tinuance of our predominant position in Persia.
II. —We might suggest at the Conference that a
mandate should be given to a foreign power to assist
Persia and that the choice -of that power should be
decided on the principle of self determination by
Persia. Whether or not Persia decided in favour of
a mandate to Great Britain would to some extent
depend on the method chosen to apply this principle.
The probable method would be a vote taken by some
sort of constituent assembly and our past experience of
the attitude of the Mejliss, the character of the present
►Shah and the instability of any Persian Government
(even one most favourable to cur interests such as the
present one) render it most unlikely that the mandate
would be given by such an assembly to Great Britain.
In any case it is suggested that our vital interests and
the considerations advanced in the immediately follow
ing paragraph as to the danger to those interests,
involved in the establishment of the influence of any
other great power in Persia, render the policy too pre
carious for His Majesty’s Government themselves to
suggest or to support, if suggested by other members of
the Conference. III.
III. —We might endeavour to secure a mandate
from the Conference for some other Power or Powers.
Our vital interests in the security of India, and Meso
potamia would appear, however, to make it most
undesirable that any great Power such as United
States or France should undertake the task, and secure .
a predominant position so close to the Indian fron
tier. This would be especially true in the case of
France, were she to secure at the Peace Conference
some direct or indirect control over parts of Syria,
over Armenia and possibly the Caucasus. There is