'Minutes memos despatches etc' [‎33v] (66/156)

6
practical chances of success for such a policy are there
fore good.
At the same time the policy is the only one that offers
us really effective security from the point of view of
India and Mesopotamia, and a reasonable opportunity
for realising some return for out financial aid to the
Persian Government and our past exertions, military
and administrative, in Persia. From another point
of view it i£ suggested that we have certain moral
commitments to Persia, a legacy from past history,
which oblige us in some degree to continue to shoulder
this burden. In the interests of civilisation it can
well be argued that our assistance is the most likely
to benefit Persia, as being the most likely to be effi
cient, in view of our past experience. In the interests
of Persia it can only be said that it will not be objec
tionable to those Persians who sincerely desire Per
sia’s future restoration and prosperity. In any case
our past unpopularity is bound to diminish, as we are
able to free ourselves of the burden of the Anglo-
Russian Convention and the odium incurred by Rus
sian methods of carrying out that Convention.
The only real objection from the British point of
view lies in the extent to which this policy might add
to our administrative and financial commitments at
a time when our resources in this direction will already
be severely strained by our expenditure in the war, by
our task in India and Egypt, and by our future com
mitments in Mesopotamia, and possibly in Arabia and
Syria. If, however, the reconstruction of Persia is
pushed forward gradually there is no reason why our
expenditure should be heavy, »while the political
advantages of the policy as a whole, combined with
the material advantages offered us of realising at any
rate some return for our past expenditure, appear to
outweigh this objection.
V.—Finding that the Peace Conference is resolutely
opposed to giving a direct mandate to Great Britain,
it is still open to us to endeavour to secure a mandate
for some other Power, to be assisted in the task of
regenerating Persia by the financial, and possibly
military, assistance of Great} Britain. As argued
under II above, this country would be Belgium, or
failing Belgium, Norway. From the point of view
of our own interests and Persian interests, the plan
is less likely to produce administrative efficiency than
that of a direct mandate to Great Britain. On the
other hand, it would probably secure for us all the
control and security which we desire, and by making
our influence felt indirectly, we should be diminishing
the extent of the unpopularity which .any form of
British interference in Persia might arouse at present
among Persian extremists and among other Powers.
The question whether we should press at the Confer
ence for a joint mandate to be given in the above form
to Belgium and ourselves, or whether we should merely
aim at securing the mandate for Belgium and relying
on securing some direct arrangement with the Belgian
Government at the time or later can hardly be sofved,
except in the light of the course which events may
take at the Conference itself.
In the light of the above considerations, the policy
of His Majesty’s Government at the Peace Conference