'Minutes memos despatches etc' [‎39v] (78/156)

• V'
The above-mentioned British syndicate also made
proposals to the Persian Government for railways from
Bunder-Abbas to Kerman, from Bunder-Abbas to
IShiraz, and from Bunder-Abbas to Mohammerah.
During the war the Russian Government completed,
for military purposes, the railway from Julfa to
Tabriz.
It is difficult to see how the question of Persian
railway concessions can be raised at the Peace Con
ference, and it w r ould appear to be in the interests of
His Majesty’s Government to resist any attempt at
the discussion of the question, thus keeping a free
hand to endeavour by direct discussion with the Persian
Government to secure concessions for the construction
of those lines which will serve both Persian and
British interests, and in this connection to press the
claims of the above-mentioned British syndicate.
With the removal of the Russian influences, both
political and commercial, and with the probability of
some form of British control over Mesopotamia and A f
the Mesopotamian railways, resulting from the Con
ference, it may well be in our interests to drop the
project of the Mohammerah—Khoremabad line and
endeavour to secure a concession for the construction : A
of a railway from Khanikin to Teheran, thus joining
Teheran with Basra via the existing Baghdad—
Khanikin Line. This may enable the large Gulf transit
trade, the preservation of wffiich w r as the chief element
in deciding His Majesty’s Government to construct the
Khoremabad railway, to be carried at a cheaper rate
via Baghdad into Northern Persia. Whilst strategic
reasons still render it desirable for us to oppose the
construction of a trans-Persian railway in any form
to the Indian frontier, the interests of Anglo-Persian
trade via the Gulf ports demand the early construction
of those above-mentioned railways other than the
Mohammerah-Khoremabad line—already proposed to
the Persian Government by the British syndicate.
(4.) Finance. Past British Expenditure and present
Commitments in Persia.
It has not been possible to complete this section for
inclusion in this memorandum, and a separate paper is in
course of preparation by the Departments concerned.
It may be well, however, to add a few general observa
tions on this important subject here.
Since 1900 the issue of Anglo-Russian loans to the
Persian Government, the terms of security and the con
ditions to be fulfilled by the Persian Government before
issue, have formed the most important subjects of diplo
matic negotiation at Teheran. The interest and sinking
fund on the various loans granted' by His Majesty’s
Government and the Government of India have been
chiefly secured on the customs receipts in the province
of Pars and at the ports in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , on the
revenue from Caspian fisheries, the posts and telegraphs
and the opium tax and excise duties on spirits (the
Russian loans being secured chiefly on the customs
receipts other than the above mentioned). In spite of
this security the Persian Government have never met
their liabilities—to an extent which may be illustrated
by the fact that, in a return to the House of Lords of
the 29th July, 1913, the total debt of the Persian Govern-
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