'Minutes memos despatches etc' [‎50v] (100/156)

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Ministry. With him in the Persian Cabinet were two other Ministers equally convinced
that the future of Persia lay in friendly reliance upon ourselves. The Shah himself
adopted the same line and backed his Ministers. Simultaneously we had sent to
Tehran as our Minister Sir Percy Cox, for many years British Resident in the Persian
Gulf, and latterly chief political officer in Mesopotamia. His object and his instructions
were to come to some arrangement with the Persian Government by which British
interests in that part of the world should be safeguarded in future from a recurrence
of the recent shocks, and by which Persia, incurably feeble and unable to stand by
herself, should be given the support that would enable her to maintain her position
among the independent nations of the world. The negotiations which have proceeded
during the last nine months, and which have now reached a satisfactory conclusion, are
the result of the joint efforts of the Persian Government and Sir Percy Cox.
What they mean in practice is this : Not that we have received or are about to
receive a mandate for Persia—on the contrary, the attempts of the Persian repre
sentatives in Paris to be heard by the Peace Conference have been attended by uniform
failure ; not that Persia has handed over to us any part of her liberties ; not that we
are assuming fresh and costly obligations which will place a great strain upon us in
the future ; but that the Persian Government, realising that we are the only neighbouring
Great Power closely interested in the fate of Persia, able and willing to help her, and
likely to be disinterested in that object, have decided of their own free will to ask us
to assist Persia in the rehabilitation of her fortunes.
If it be asked why we should undertake the task at all, and why Persia should
not be left to herself and allowed to rot into picturesque decay, the answer is that her
geographical position, the magnitude of our interests in the country, and the future
safety of our Eastern Empire render it impossible for us now—just as it would have
been impossible for us at any time during the past fifty years—to disinterest ourselves
from what happens in Persia. Moreover, now that we are about to assume the mandate
for Mesopotamia, which will make us coterminous with the western frontiers of Persia,
we cannot permit the existence, between the frontiers of our Indian Empire in
Baluchistan and those of our new Protectorate, of a hotbed of misrule, enemy intrigue,
financial chaos, and political disorder. Further, if Persia were to be left alone, there
is every reason to fear that she would soon be overrun by Bolshevik influences from
the north. Lastly, we possess in the south-western corner of Persia great assets in
the shape of the oilfields, which are worked for the British Navy and which give us a
commanding interest in that part of the world.
In these circumstances, the desire of the Foreign Office and India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. in
combination has been to make an arrangement by which, without assuming a
direct control over Persian administration or involving ourselves in continued financial
responsibilities on a large scale, we should yet be able to provide Persia with the expert
assistance and advice which will enable the State to be rebuilt.
Under the terms of the agreement which has now been negotiated, we undertake to
supply, at the cost of the Persian Government, such expert advisers as may be
considered necessary for the various branches of the Persian Administration. Amongst
other things, the Persian Government desire to establish a uniform force, into which
shall be incorporated all the various elements—Persian regulars and gendarmerie, the
Cossack Brigade, the South Persia Rifles, &c.—which have hitherto existed in various
parts of the country. We propose to lend such officers as maybe required to organise
this force. Further, the Treasury has agreed to make an advance to the Persian Govern
ment of 2,000,000/., to be shared equally by the Government of India and the Treasury,
and to be secured upon the Persian customs revenues, in order to allow the Persian
Government to initiate (he reforms which are in contemplation. It is formally stipulated
that the first instalment of this shall not be paid until the British financial adviser
has assumed his duties. In the remaining parts of the agreement will be found various
provisions which will enable us to back the Persian Government in realising several of
their unsatisfied claims.
The upshot of these arrangements is, not that Persia will be converted in any
sense into a British Protectorate: on the contrary, the first article of the agreement
pledges His Majesty’s Government to respect absolutely the independence and
integrity of the country; but that the reign of foreign intrigue and of jealous
competition between rival Powers, with the consequent disorganisation in Persia, will
be, if we are successful, brought to an end, and that Persia herself, if she plays the
game, will have the best chance of recuperation that she has enjoyed at any time
during the past century. Finally, this agreement, if satisfactorily carried out, will be
a valuable guarantee for the future peace of the Eastern world.