Coll 28/112A ‘Persia. Tabriz – Monthly despatches of internal situation in Azerbaijan & misc. reports.’ [‎128v] (257/1237)

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Government and to declare their loyalty to the Shah. These professions of loyalty
were probably genuine; there is nothing to show that the Kurds of Azerbaijan
are prepared to co-operate even with each other, let alone with those of Iraq, and
though there have been one or two reports of the coming and going of Kurdish
agents across the Iraq frontier these visits would seem to have produced no
tangible results. While the Kurds are no more consistent in their outlook and no
more uniform in character than any other of the races that make up the
population of Azerbaijan, it may be said that, in general, what they want is not
political independence so much as a square deal from the Persian Government.
The chiefs, being big landowners, have everything to gain from a state of security
which will enable them to obtain the maximum profits from the cultivation of
wheat, tobacco and fruit. But old tradition and bitter experience make them
resent any attempt to impose this security by Persian bayonets. A policy of
extending medical and educational facilities to the Kurdish districts, of ensuring
just distribution of monopoly goods and granting assistance for town and village
improvement, carried out by sympathetic and honest officials, Avhile leaving
responsibility for public security largely to the Kurds themselves—in brief, fewer
gendarmes and more sugar—would probably remove most of the grievances the
j Kurds at present nourish.
16. For most of the period, being winter, the peace of the Kurdish districts
has been broken only by minor incidents of robbery or assault. But in February
a chance encounter between a small body of Persian troops and a few Kurds of
the Herki tribe in Rauze Chai near Rezaieh led to the death of a Persian officer
and a punitive expedition against the Kurds of the district in which about five
Kurds were killed. As the Kurds were followers of Rashid Beg Herki, who is
said to have joined the Tudeh party, this incident seemed at first as if it
might be the curtain-raiser to more serious attacks on Persian authority in
Western Azerbaijan, Tut it now seems probable that it arose out of nothing more
than the traditional hostility between Kurd and Persian soldier. At about the
same time there was an attack by Kurds in Mahabad against the police station
there. Five policemen were killed and the station sacked. There is even less
political significance in this incident. The most likely explanation is that it was
caused by dissatisfaction with the way monopoly goods were being distributed.
It seems, however, both to have spurred the Persian Government to make a show
of authority in that district and to have convinced the Soviet authorities that
such a show is necessary. Preparations are now afoot to establish a Persian
garrison in Mahabad and it is reliably reported that the Russians have given
their assent.
17. Fifteen Shakkak and Herki chieftains, among them the young son of
the late Ismail Agha (Simqo), came to Tabriz for the Tudeh party conference and
the party claimed that they had offered their support. Only one of them, however,
Rashid Beg Herki of Targivar, seems in fact to have joined the party. Both
Persian officials with experience of Azerbaijan and Kurdish informants alike
are emphatic that the Kurds would never make common cause with the Tudeh
party, but at the same time there are well authenticated reports from Western
Azerbaijan of Kurdish chieftains using the threat of raids to force Persian
villagers to join the party. The explanation is probably that one or two chiefs
see in the activities of the Tudeh party a promise of unrest and a weakening of
Persian authority which they may exploit to their own advantage. It is certainly
most unlikely that any part of the Tudeh social and economic programme would
appeal to these feudal highlanders. The visit of these chieftains to Tabriz, the
Tudeh party’s flirtation with them and the marked increase in Tudeh party
activity in Western Azerbaijan led some Persian officials, as well as the more
easify alarmed merchant classes, to believe that some kind of coup d’Etat was being
plotted by the Tudeh party in conjunction with the Kurds and that the spring
would see a serious attack on Persian authority in Western Azerbaijan. Nothing
has occurred to confirm these fears and they seem now to a great extent to have
been allayed.
18. Economic Situation .—The near approach of Allied victory in Europe
is having precisely the effect on Tabriz trade and industry that was long ago
predicted. It is doubtful whether anything could keep the costly local industries
going, but the paralysis of commerce is perhaps largely psychological, it being
the deeply rooted conviction of the dealers that the defeat of Germany will
immediately open the flood-gates of plenty, and that Persia will be at once deluged
with cheap imported commodities with which the high-priced stocks of the local
merchants cannot compete. Over the last six months there has been an increasing
willingness to sell and an increasing reluctance to buy. Wholesale prices have
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