Coll 28/112A ‘Persia. Tabriz – Monthly despatches of internal situation in Azerbaijan & misc. reports.’ [‎551r] (1104/1237)

clubs grow strong, but they do not appear to have taken any great trouble to keep
them alive. As regards enrolment of candidates for citizenship. I still keep an
open mind. It is at least possible that the initiative has come from persons
anxious to curry favour and that ignorant persons have given inaccurate accounts
of what takes place as regards enrolment.
More important still is the fact that patriotism, as usual, is thriving under
adversity. I have been impressed by the increased sense of solidarity among the
Moslems, not merely religious solidarity, but rather political. The threat of
-- becoming detached by Russia has quickened the desire for Persian unity which
Reza Shah sought to foster. It is a threat which has been exaggerated, and which
the Persians would have been wise to invent even if the Russians had not given
them some justification. The Kurdish disorders were similarly exaggerated to
exploit national, and if possible foreign, feeling against the Russians and the
Kurds. It is a matter of great interest that when a Deputy, labatabay, said that
the trouble at Rezaieh had been greatly exaggerated, the Chamber showed every
sign of wrath, to the extent, I believe, of violence; but from the meagre reports
at mv disposal he was nearer the truth than any other speaker in the Chamber.
The Persian Government has many difficulties, but apart from the Kurds
there is more loyalty to it in Azerbaijan to-day than when Reza Shah was in
power, and the Persianisation which he sought to impose is progressing faster
to-day with the Russians here than he was able to make it. The people want it
now; they didn’t then.
(d) The Chief of the Customs here has told me that he reproached
M. Agronoff with making enormous profit from the resale of the sugar supplied
by the British, and that the Soviet trade delegate replied simply to the effect that
there was a war on and that Russia needs rials.
One constant Persian complaint is that the Russian frontier is virtually open
since the Russians do not allow the Persian customs officials to control exports
and imports properlv.
Russo-Turkish Relations .—1 have His Majesty’s Minister’s instructions to
do everything possible to improve relations between the Russians and the Turks
here. I accordingly see my Turkish colleague frequently, too frequently for my
liking in view of his propensity for distorted and sensational reporting.
The Turks I have met in Azerbaijan fear and obstinately distrust the
Russians. I hold out little hope of being able to convert them and, indeed, I have
to confess that a good deal of my effort has to go in resisting the Turk’s attempt to
persuade me that his view of the Russians is held by many British officials.
For their part the Russians know that the Turkish Consul-General makes
no secret of his conviction that the Germans are bound to break through, and they
suspect that he has even talked with the local authorities about the situation
which might arise if the Russians did have to leave. I have done my best to
persuade °my Russian colleague that M. Ramazanoglou’s anxieties are
exaggerated by the abnormal state of. his health, that they are primarily for the
safety of his own country, that he is not pro-German; but it is at such talk that
M. Koulagenkov's face goes wooden.
All the courtesies are, of course, observed. When the Turkish Vice-Consul
fell sick at Rezaieh the Russians sent a military doctor to see him, there being
no qualified local doctor available, and the Turks were very grateful.
Anglo-Russian Relations .—A set of negative ideas such as I possessed about
the Russians when I came here (see paragraph 2) was poor equipment for anyone
hoping to develop cordial and fruitful relations. Something positive was most
desirable. Admiration for the performance of the Russian army, for the
discipline and behaviour of the troops here offered an obvious and easy beginning.
One’s inward confidence of being able to make some progress increased with the
realisation that there is a distinction to be made here between pure Russians
such as General Melnik and M. Koulagenkov, and Caucasians, who are more
Communist than the real Russians and who must take a good deal of the blame
for the less reassuring aspects of Russian policy here. I am glad to say that the
political agents seem to be losing power, and that the general and the consul-
general seem freer now to take decisions of their own. Then as regards Russian
methods, e.g., the resale of our sugar, they are certainly not Bank of Fnglanct,
but then the Russians have a sharper awareness than we British of the sternness
of the times and their needs are keener; and there is merit in a realism which
knows what is necessarv and goes straight after it. And so in the end I came
to examine critically the ideas with which I was originally furnished and found
no difficulty in discarding or modifying them.
At the end of May. however, certain incidents which need not be described
again seemed to block the way towards better understanding with the Russians.