Coll 28/112A ‘Persia. Tabriz – Monthly despatches of internal situation in Azerbaijan & misc. reports.’ [‎557v] (1117/1237)

in their power to do so. There seemed to me to be a strong probability that, if
the Persian troops came to Rezaieh while the villagers were still there ip their
thousands, not even the wisest of commanders could prevent an outburst oi
emotion w^hich might produce troublesome incidents. Yet when I got there a
deadlock between the Governor-General and the Russians was apparent ovei th£^
establishment of joint road guard posts, a.nd neither side was making any move-
to persuade the villagers to go home. .
Since I began writing this despatch I have had a conversation w ith the
Persian commander. He seems to be unusually reasonable for a Persian officei,
and I think he will do his best to avoid incidents. I do not think he is a strong
character, however, and I doubt if he possesses the perseverance which his task
will demand of him. , .
His troops are moving northwards slowly because his lorries cannot lilt the
whole force at the same time, so the sections are being leap-frogged. Moreover,
some of his tank-carrying vehicles have had difficulty in negotiating the tortuous
approaches to certain narrow bridges. He cannot now be in Rezaieh before the
30th or the 31st, and I can only hope that by then the majority of the villagers
will have become tired of the town and plucked up the courage to go home.
Tlie Persian Government'’s Position in Western Azerbaijan. —Despite the
Government’s neglect of this distant province, despite the incompetence and folly
of its officers, I found its position surprisingly strong for the moment. I suspect
that the Governor-General here has been more active these past months among
the more important Kurdish tribes than is generally known, and that the sugar,
presents and appointments which he has given to the chiefs of the larger tribes
have been more effective than medals and trips to Baku. The line, of course, had
to be drawn somewhere and for face-saving purposes the Government had to
establish its authority over some of the Kurds, preferably, I would suppose, those
within easy reach of Rezaieh. Unfortunately, as it has turned out, the line was
drawn a trifle too high and by his violent foolishness, perhaps also by his inability
to secure Russian goodwill, Serhang Hashimi failed signally to establish the
Government’s authority even in the Rezaieh plain. The big tribes like the
Karapapak, Momish, Piran, Mangur, Denboukri, Faisullah beghli and a large
section of the Shekak are on the Government’s side. It was the smaller tribes,
the Begzadeh, the Herki, Mamedi and Hinari, which caused the trouble. They
would normally be punished by the despatch of troops to their villages, but this
is not the moment for that. For one reason, the 1,500 men which these Kurds can,
at a pinch, put into the field would be more than a match for the force now going
to Rezaieh with Russian approval. The first complication would be a Persian
demand for many more troops, and then, if they gained the upper hand, they
would behave in a manner whidh the Russians would not approve. The wise
solution is to extend to these discontented Kurds the benefits which have kept
the larger tribes friendly, so as to gain time. The Governor-General at Rezaieh
thinks it can be done, but the Russians must, at the same time, allow the Persians
some means of saving their faces.
Position of the Russians. —The Russians came to Azerbaijan with all the
prestige which their claim to be the protectors of the peasantry gave them. They
have quite lost it, because to the simple peasants of Azerbaijan, and they are
the bulk of the population, the results speak for themselves. For them the coming
of the Russians, for that matter the Anglo-Russian occupation, has meant heavy
loss and the quickening of old hatreds and fears. The Christians abhor the
recent disorders almost as much as the Shiahs. They have derived no present
benefit from them; on the contrary, they have a lively fear that the day of
reaction may come as it has always tended to come in the past. Only the Kurds
can be supposed to be happy with matters as they now are, but the best of them
are in the Persian Government’s pay and, if the Persians are wise, they will make
an effort to find a means of pacifying those who have shown themselves strong
enough to make serious trouble.
If. however, the Persians now commit some act of folly against the rebel
Kurds, they may very easily alienate some of those now friendly and cause more
than the present small proportion to turn to the Russians as their hope.
I have little doubt, however, that it is their conception of their military
necessities, and not any political theory or ambition, which has determined
Russian policy latterly i.n Azerbaijan. The political officers are no doubt at
work in a routine fashion, but events have caused them to lose ground so markedly