'SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS AND MEASURES OF THE VICEROYALTY OF HIS EXCELLENCY LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON, VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA IN THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT. I. JANUARY 1899-APRIL 1904. II. DECEMBER 1904-NOVEMBER 1905. VOLUME IV. PERSIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF.' [‎98v] (201/386)

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appear to have "been ever considered by the Government of India from the
only point of view from which, in Lord Curzon’s opinion, it ought to be
regarded, viz., as a protective, and not an offensive, measure. Russia had not
at that time proved her intention to draw Seistan within the radius of her
political influence; the railway was accordingly discussed and condemned,
as a means of attacking Russia in Northern Persia, not as a means of keeping
Russia out of Southern Persia. Moreover, at that time the Quetta-Seistan trade
route not having been opened, the possible commercial value of the line
was not taken into account at all. Secondly, the conditions postulated by Sir
H. Brackenbury in London as a precedent to any idea of railway construction
in this quarter had since been realised. Baluchistan was rapidly being deve
loped; the frontier tribes had passed completely under our control; a per
manent line of communication with Seistan had been opened; while the
very conditions, which he subsequently, when Military Member in India,
noting again upon the scheme, said might compel a change of attitude upon
our part, viz., Russian initiative in the process of southerly extension from her
existing railway system had been fulfilled by the construction on her part,
without provocation or incentive from us, of the Merv-Kbushk line.* It was
clear, therefore, that the question stood upon a different looting from any that
it had previously occupied ; and that the facts and arguments which weighed
formerly with the Government of India were inapplicable to the present
situation. So far as gradients, water-crossings, and fuel were coneeroed, little
or no difficulty would be met with in laying a line across the 400 and odd
miles that intervened between Nushki and Seistan, but the complete dearth of
water over long stretches of the route and the problem of the shifting sands
would present a serious obstacle.f
17. If an understanding were arrived at with Russia conoerning spheres of
interest in Persia, which would leave Seistan within the British zone, there
might be no neeessity, at any rate for the present, for a Quetta-Seistan Rail-
way. And in the event of such an understanding being declared impracticable,
Lord Curzon, while concurring with Lord Salisbury that a Quetta-Seistan
Railway might be one of the measures we should then be bound to adopt for
the protection of our interests in Southern Persia, was yet in favour of con-,
solidating our position in the interior, of fostering the incipient trade, of
acquiring further information about tire tracts to be traversed, and of fami
liarising the Perso-Baluch border Linds, and Seistan in particular, with our
presence and influence, before deciding upon such a forward move. Previous
to advocating even the comparatively easy advance of connecting Quetta by
rail-road with Nushki (bO miles), he would like to see Nushki developed by an
interval of settled British administration. In a few years’ time we should be
in a better position to pronounce upon ideas, the execution of which would for
the present be somewhat in the nature of an experiment.
18. In the despatch of 21st September 1899, to which this Minute was an
accompaniment, the steps were detailed which should be taken to retain Seistan
in the British zone. It was proposed to reduce the expenditure on the
Meshed establishment, by a reduction of the grade of the Political Agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency.
stationed there (this was effected in February 1900) and tojapply the money
saved to a more vigilant attention to Seistan. If a Russian officer were sent
to Seistan, a British Consul also w ould have to be permanently appointed.
19. As regards the trade route additional sums w T ere to be spent upon the
better provision of wells, accommodation, supplies of fodder and other stores,
and for the protection of the track.
20. Sucli, then, was the position in Seistan in 1839 and the lines of policy
with regard to that area which were laid down by Lord Curzon in the first
year of his administration.
21. In pursuance of the principles laid down in the Minute, statements of
general British policy in respect to Seistan were made to the Persian Govern
ment at Lord Curzon s instance in connection with the Hashmat-ul Mulk and
the reported sale of the Crown lands, vide Russian activity in Seistan, Chapter
XVI, paragraphs 35—42, pages 137—139.
* And subfequently of the Tajend-Sarakhs line.
+ Surveys made in 1903 hare shown that the task of constructing a line from Nushki to Koh-i-Malik Siah
Would be simple and also that a good alignment could ho found between J\ ushki and the Helmand above Khwaja Ali.