'SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS AND MEASURES OF THE VICEROYALTY OF HIS EXCELLENCY LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON, VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA IN THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT. I. JANUARY 1899-APRIL 1904. II. DECEMBER 1904-NOVEMBER 1905. VOLUME IV. PERSIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF.' [‎64v] (133/386)

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future, as well as of all existing, Customs-houses should form the guarantee for
the loan; (2) a provision for making the advance to the Persian Govern
ment in part in kraus minted at St. Petersburg; and (3) the insertion of a
clause to interpret the earlier loan contract as prohibiting the Persian Govern
ment not only from “ issuing ” but from “contracting ” any foreign loan “ a
longue echeance without the consent of Russia.
24. Thus supplied with funds the Shah made a second journey to Europe
British loan of 1903. ^ ie the first journey were
repeated. Huge sums were expended on
baubles and profusely lavished on courtesans ; and at the opening of the year
1903, the resources of the State were again exhausted.* The Russian Government
again let it be known, that a third loan of £1,000,000., or even more 5
would .be. forthcoming in return for fresh surrenders of Persian independence*
and this time one of the concessions asked was a Russian railway from the
Trans-Caspian frontier to a point on the Indian Ocean within striking distance
of the British frontier. Threatened by Court intrigues and by a clerical
Muhammadan movement against his subservience to Russia, the Amin-es-Sultan
would not even discuss this proposal. He, however, applied to St. Petersburg
in March 1903 for an advance of £200,000 secured on the royalties of the
Caspian Sea fisheries, which were leased to a Russian subject at a rental of
£20,000 a year, the transaction being a sale of rights for the period of 22 years
during which the concession had yet to run, rather than a loan. This
money the Russian Government was prepared to give in return for a practical
control of the Persian Mint, which would have enabled the Russian Bank to
sweep out of existence its rival, the Imperial Bank of Persia, one of the most
important British institutions in the country. These terms the Persian Govern
ment refused to accept. M. Naus then applied to the Imperial Bank of Persia for
an advance of from two hundred to three hundred thousand pounds, and Sir
A. Hardmge strongly urged that this opportunity, which might prove the first
step to the recovery of our political position in Tehran, should not be lost. The
occasion m fact as His Excellency the Viceroy pointed out, seemed to be an
exact replica of that which Her Majesty’s Government had always regretted
having missed m 1900 with the difference that the Indian Government were
now prepared to share tne responsibility. Lord Curzon’s Government expressed
readiness to find the money and on the 26th February 1903 tele^aphed
m reply to the Secretary of State that as the protection of the Karun vallev
and the region between Mohammerah and Kermanshah which it had often
been shown were important.from an Imperial rather than Indian standpoint
was included m His Lordship’s proposals they Tvere clearly not made exclusively
with reference to the. defence of India. At the same time it was recognised
that the plan contained the germ of valuable suggestion and its pursuance was
aXso^XVwT C ? ndltl0n ’ m ‘*-’ that no S a P should be left between Seistan
a d South-East 1 ersia--a vague geographical definition—and the Karun river
Otherwise, it would leave Russia free to come down to the sea alv
where m intervening territory, and to build a railway to Bunder Abbas Bushire
or other ports On condition that the entire belt of territory south of a W
passmg through .Seistan, Kerman, Yezd, Ispahan, Burujird, Kermanshah and
K anikin were included in the proposed monopoly, the Government of India
sum u W t, anc rf ney and / dded for Lb a eouee^n pos ^ a
EiCSHrEr- £ - - vs
otherpubli c wo rks in the area concec J ”
*F“r «
h.gk interest to the Shah, which hare eventually to' be eonsolidaterinra LgetpoTtlealToan ? 8 ' 1 “