'SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS AND MEASURES OF THE VICEROYALTY OF HIS EXCELLENCY LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON, VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA IN THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT. I. JANUARY 1899-APRIL 1904. II. DECEMBER 1904-NOVEMBER 1905. VOLUME IV. PERSIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF.' [‎18v] (41/386)

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the hills. The Chiefs declared their willingness to join in opening u,->
the road: and the prospects of success seemed bright. In the following
October, Mr. Lorimer again passed safely, by the same route, to Khoremabad,
where he was joined by Colonel Douglas, Military Attache at the British
But on the return journey, the two officers were attache l
tribesmen, robbed of all their property, and themselves wounded.
Legation,
bv
Kepeated representations to the Persian Government resulted in the despatch
of a Persian army to avenge the outrage. But the unfortunate incident,
coupled with the departure on leave of Mr. Lorimer, made it necessary to
postpone the measures which were contemplated for opening up the new route.
But the attention of the Government of India was soon to be called to a
new quarter. In June 3905, the news reached India of the institution of a
Russian motor service on the roads which link the Russian frontier with
Tehran and llamadan. Lord Curzon felt that it was imperative to take some
counter-move. A Persian nohleman, the Sani-ed-Dowleh, held, by grant from
the Shab, the sole right of motor traffic in Persia. The concession, how’ever,
had not debarred the institution of an independent motor service on the
Russian roads, and the Viceroy proposed that the Persian Transport Company
should be urged to undertake a similar service on their road from Tehran to
Ispahan. Further south than this, it w r as impossible for the Persian Transport
^ . . Company to go, without infringing on
^ the rignts of the Sam-ed-Dowleh. It
was proposed, therefore, that the further step should he taken of buying the
control of the Sani-ed-Dowleh’s service. It might then be decided at leisure
whether it w r ould be preferable to keep the Persian motor cars off the road until
improved communications with the coast enabled British goods to hold their
own wares with Russian in the markets of the interior, or to develop the
Persian service, or to subsidise the service by the Transport Company. It was
not clear whether the Persian Government were themselves in any way respons
ible for the Russian service, and it was suggested that, should this be ascert-
Proposed road Bunder Abbas to Bam. ?* ne f ?° c ase, compensation should
be claimed in the shape of a concession
for the construction of a road from Bunder Abbas to Bam, with such
extensions as might be deemed desirable towards Seistan and Ispahan.
Simultaneously with the proposed demand for a concession from the Persian
Government, an officer was despatched to examine and report upon the line
of the suggested road which, there is reason to believe, must some day form an
artery of British trade. The whole of inland Persia lies on an elevated plateau
raised by several thousand feet above t he level of the coasts. From Bunder
Abbas, from Bushire, and from Mohammerah, the ancient roads of commerce
lead inland over lofty passes and through steep and rugged mountain chains.
The risks of transport and the cost of freight have seriously impeded the
growth of British trade which finds its natural entry at the southern ports.
The line by which it w^as proposed to open out a road gives access to the
plateau by easier gradients and without encountering any formidable ratine of
hills. The tableland of Central Persia once attained, all" serious obstacles are
passed, and the way lies open whether on the east to Aasratabad or on the west
by Yezd to Ispahan. From the coast to Regan and Kerman the route lay
through an area in which it was essential that British influence should reio-u
supreme. The road, moreover, would prepare the way for future railway
construction. The advance of Russian railways from the north had Ion"- been
imminent; and none could say when the day might come when the building
of a British line to Nasratabad could no longer be deferred. The military
advisers of the Government bad pointed out the risks of continuing tl e Indian
railway from Nushki to the Persian border. Such a line, in tl^evcnt of' a
withdrawal from Seistan in time of war, would place at the disposal of the
enemy the means of a direct advance on the important position at Quetta A
line connecting wMi the coast at Bunder Abbas would only lead a hostile
army further from its goal.
Attempts weie abo made to foster trade bv other means It was
evident that Russia was slowly but surely gaining a firmer hold in
Central Persia, and constant elicits were cn loot to secure for Russian