'SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS AND MEASURES OF THE VICEROYALTY OF HIS EXCELLENCY LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON, VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA IN THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT. I. JANUARY 1899-APRIL 1904. II. DECEMBER 1904-NOVEMBER 1905. VOLUME IV. PERSIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF.' [‎53v] (111/386)

8
■With reference to the suggested partition of Persia into spheres of
influence His Lordship explained that any overtures on the subject to the
Kussian Government would probably be misrepresented to the Shah as mdicat-
ing a desire on the part of Great Britain
opinion of Her Majesty’s Government. ^ effect an immediate partition of his
dominions; and that Her Majesty’s Government were not disposed for the time
bein" to make any proposals on the subject. They preferred rather to rest
content w r th three important announcements already made to the Persian Gov
ernment, two of which had been made during the interval consequent on the
Russian loan of 1900. But Lord Curzon’s views as to these pronouncements
and on the general position taken up in the above reply are best indicated in
His Lordship’s reply of 6th September 1900, which was as follows:—
‘‘ The first four paragraphs of Your Lordship's reply relate to matters, sueh as Consular
appointments in Persia (concerning which wo may observe that we have as yet heard nothing
more of the revised proposals of Sir M. Durand), the question of a Quetta-Nushki-Seistan
Railway, and the Kanin subsidy—upon all of which we shall address Your Lordship independ
ently. The remainder of the despatch furnishes us with the views of Her Majesty’s Gov
ernment upon the wider subject raised in our oiiginal letter, namely, the policy to be pursued
for the defence of British interests in Persia, and notably in Southern Persia, as a whole.
« \y e are grateful to Your Lordship for this communication of the views of Her Majesty's
Government. We accept the statement that events are occurring in Persia which, ever since
our despatch*of September 1899 was written, have modified the situation, not to the advantage
of Great Britain. Indeed we ourselves a year ago made the probability of such change, of
which there were already signs, the ground for an appeal for an early decision and for early
action on the part of Her Majesty's Government. The following were our words
« ‘ WS press for an early decision and for early action, since, unless we bestir ourselves,
there is good reason for fearing that the already trembling balance may be disturbed by others
to our disadvantage—'
“The conclusion of the Russo-Persian loan a few months later more than justified these
fears; while the events to which Your Lordship alludes in the 7th paragraph of your reply
indicate that the activity of Foreign Powers in Persia and its neighbourhood has not slackened,
but has, on the contrary, increased during the interval. This process may be expected in our
opinion to continue; and we think that it will demand constant precaution and unremitting
vigilance.
“ It does not, perhaps, behove us to comment at any length upon the several propositions
which have been laid down by Your Lordship. We are ourselves far from admitting that the
position gained by Russia on land enables her as yet ‘to dominate and threaten almost the
whole of Persia.' We think that the extent to which she is permitted to do so still depends
even more upon the action of Her Majesty's Government than it does upon her own. Neither
do we recognise any reflection of our own views or utterances in the remark that ‘it can hardly
be maintained that in view of foreign competition, civilised pou ers can be permanently denied
the benefit of access to the ports of Persia, because their admission will infringe upon a mono
poly which we have hitherto enjoyed.’
“ If the reference is to access by sea, clearly such approach never has been or would ever
be likely to be denied by Great Britain. If the reference is to access by land, we have never
said anything to deprecate the connection of the Persian ports by railway with the interior, and
the free use of sueh ports by the subjects or’merchandise of Foreign Pow-ers. What we have all
along deprecated and must continue to deprecate is that any such railways,—leading to ports
within a sphere in which British interests are unquestionably predominant, and in which it
cannot be alleged that any other Foreign Power possesses any interest comparable with our
own,—should he constructed as the instruments of political or military ambition, and should
terminate in maritime exits, which might before long lie converted into the coaling stations or
the naval bases of foreign fleets. We have no objection whatever to the construction of
railways in the south or in any other part of Persia, though we entertain the liveliest doubt as
to whether in a country as backward and so mountainous they would ever repay the expense of
construction. All that we maintain is that, if Persia decides to construct railways in the south,
she should not do so except with our consent, and, if possible, with our co-operation; and that
the so-called development of the country should not be made an excuse for open and flagrant
detriment to British interest.
“ We rejoice to think that on this point we share the views that are apparently held by
Her Majesty’s Government. At least this is the inference that we draw from the intimation
that was authorised by the Marquis of Salisbury to the Persian Government on the 4th April
last, in which the present Shah was reminded of the promise of his father, the late Shah, ‘ that
no southern railway concession shall be granted to any foreign company without consultation
with Her Majesty's Government' We confess, however, to a doubt whether the general
character or the particular terms of this pledge are sueh as altogether to preclude the Fersian
Government from entering into engagements, even with regard to railway matters in Southern
Persia, with a Foreign Power or Powers, which might violate the spirit, even while observing