'SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS AND MEASURES OF THE VICEROYALTY OF HIS EXCELLENCY LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON, VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA IN THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT. I. JANUARY 1899-APRIL 1904. II. DECEMBER 1904-NOVEMBER 1905. VOLUME IV. PERSIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF.' [‎103r] (210/386)

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accordingly, left for the border with M. Molitor, who throughout acted in con
sultation with the Russian Consul. Major Beun urged the Governor to settle
the matter amicably, and represented that if a friendly settlement was
impossible, he alone, if duly authorised, could intervene. The Governor pro
mised to be cautious, but Major Beun believed thatM. Miller was deliberately
enhancing the gravity of the situation to furnish an excuse for demanding the
despatch of Cossacks for self-protection or of other Persian troops to intimidate
the pro-British Governor. The Government of India pointed out to the
Secretary of State that M. Miller had no locus standi in the case, and urged
that a strong protest should be made against his interference. They also
requested that the Persian Government should be reminded of their obligation
under article 6 of the Treaty of 1857 to refer the dispute to the British Govern
ment, and proposed to address the Amir in a similar sense. Thanks to Major
Benn's influence with the Afghans and the Hashmat-ul-Mulk, a conflict was
averted, and both sides withdrew their troops from the border. Mutual com
plaints, however, continued to be made of wrongful diversions of the river
water and destruction of dams, but the chief cause of trouble really was that,
owing to the exceptional drought, the Helmand itself was nearly dry, and no
water was available for either Afghan or Persian villagers, both of whom were
suffering alike, ho time was lost by the Persian Government in calling for the
intervention of His Majesty’s Government under the Treaty of 1857 to define
the border and restore the legitimate rights of Persia, and on 31st July 1902
the Government of India addressed the Amir (Habibulla Khan) calling his
attention to the clause in the treaty referred to by the Persians, which provided
that in case of differences arising between the Government of Persia and the
Government of Afghanistan, the Persian Government shall refer them for
adjustment to the friendly offices of the British Government, and shall not
take up arms unless these friendly oftices fail of effect. His Highness was
reminded that by the arrangement with his late father, the control of the
foreign relations of Afghanistan rests with the British Government, and his appro
val was invited to the suggestion that a British olficer should be appointed as
arbitrator to settle the dispute. Two months elapsed without any reply from His
Highness, and the Viceroy on 3rd October 1902 again addressed him on the subject,
pointing out that the case was one which the Amir was bound by agreement
to refer*to the British Government and that it was desirable that the British
officer, appointed as arbitrator, should make an early start as soon as the
cold weather began. Meanwhile the situation was rapidly becoming more
acute, the Afghans were building vosyrQ bands to interrupt the supply, leiufoice
ments of troops from both sides were rumoured to be approaching Seistan, and
an armed conflict between the Persians and Afghans threatened to break out at
anv moment T he Vicerov, therefore, on 20th October despatched an urgent
communication to the British Agent at Kabul, directing him to ask for on
immediate audience of the Amir to convey an important message from the
Government of India, to the effect that they could nob accept the responsibility
of alio win" the interests both of peace and of the Afghan territories and people
in Soistan°to he further imperilled by His Highness’s failure to reply to the
Viceroy’s two previous letters, and that unless an immediate answer was
received, accepting the offices of the British arbitrator and making the neces
sary arrangements for the appointment of his Afghan colleague, Major
McMahon, who had been nominated for this task, would be authorised to
start without delay in order to prevent further trouble and to vindicate the
position of Great Britain as arbitrator in the tract under dispute. Meanwhile,
on 15th October, the Amir hid written ignoring the proposal to send a British
arbitrator altogether and professing his ability to settle the matter by corres
pondence in accordance with the Goldsmid map, and,in reply to the urgent
message delivered to him by the British Agent at Kabul, he merely referred
to bis answer of October 15th. Instructions were then gc'sen for Major
McMahon’s Mission to assemble at Quetta.
23. A further letter to the Amir was despatched on 21th November, ex-
plainin" to him the terms of the Goldsmid award, which made it cleai that the
river itself below the Kohak band was the boundary and was not wholly includ
ed in Afghan territory as His Highness had supposed from the way in which.