'SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS AND MEASURES OF THE VICEROYALTY OF HIS EXCELLENCY LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON, VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA IN THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT. I. JANUARY 1899-APRIL 1904. II. DECEMBER 1904-NOVEMBER 1905. VOLUME IV. PERSIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF.' [‎123v] (251/386)

142
Mushir-ed-Dawleli’s note was considered unfriendly, becnuse lie Imd wished
simply to give an assurance that whatever change might be made in the
administration of Seistan, it would have no political significance, or affect the
friendship between the two Governments.
52. In December 1903 the Persian Government decided to summon to
Tehran the Governors of Provinces in order to discuss the possibility of introducing
a new svstcm ot tnxut on, a d t IIu hmat ul ^AIullv was among those invited to
attend. After exhausting every argument to excuse himself from obeying the
summons, the Hashmat finally left Seistan for the capital on 10th March
1904, reaching it in July, his son, Mir Masum KJian, formally takin" over the
duties of Deputy Governor.
53. On his arrival in Tehran he was detained there on various pretexts by
the Persian Government practically as a political detenu. The Persian Govern
ment, without removing him, took away all his power by placing foreign affairs
in Seistan under the Karguzar and frontier affairs under a Sarhaddar,° at that
time the Ynmin-i-Nizam, and also by sending the Mustansir-ul-Mulk to enquire
about the revenue. 1
64 Rumours also filled the air while the Hashmat was at Tehran that his
deposition had been determined on, and His Majesty’s Government throughout
the various proposals and counter-proposals of the Persian Government took up a
strong position warning them against any step calculated to disturb the status quo
which might compel His Majesty’s Government to alter fundamentally their policy
as to Seistan and adjoining regions. It was hinted that it might be impossible if the
Hashmat were removed to withdraw the boundarv mission from Seistan
The Government of India, on being consulted, fully endorsed this attitude in a
telegram, dated the 28th October 1904, and further pointed out that the position
taken upby the TersianGovernment wasmostunsatisfactorv, as evidenced by their
action as to quarantine arrangements in the Gulf, at Hen jam, in the matter’of the
Punder Abbas apd ScMan Telegraphs, the establishment of a Customs post at
Godar-i-Balutak, the introduction of fresh Russian signallers at Meshed and the
proposal regarding the withdrawal of consular guards. It was suggested that
m the event of Persia continuing in her anti-British policy in Seistan the
question of securing control of the Helmand might have to assume a more
prominent position in our negotiations with the Amir than the Government
of India were at the time disposed to give it, and that an intimation mmht
also with advantage he conveyed to the Persian Government that the
Dntish Government would not in the future be disposed, as hitherto, actively
to exercise on behalf of the Central Government their influence with the
maritime and frontier Chiefs, over whom the Persian Government had
found it difficult to maintain their direct control. In other ways too British
support was given to the Hashmat. His Majesty’s Legation were authorised
to guarantee loans—the Government of India being a joint guarantor-by
the Imperial Bank of Persia to enable him to discharge claims made upon him by
the ^ovorument. The Persian Government, however, hesitated to decide
the matter rrgardmg the Hashmat and meanwhile both Mr. GrantDuff and Colonel
McMahon expressed the opinion that the Hashmat was politically of little
use to us and not a worthy object of solicitude. Such bein<» the ease and in
view of the deadlock reached in his case, the Government of India su^ested
to the Secretary of State on the 3rd January 1905, that the s tuation mi|ht be
«th Ve ,h, a P^innT gCillCnt “ffain, generally might be effected
nf rL u 1 elsmr ' Government if objection were withdrawn to the removal
o the Hashmat-ul-Mulk on condition that lie was suitably provided elsewhere
It was pointed out that but for the Russian attitude about Vim which was V
consequence of Ins action in the riois of ]903, in all probability the Govern*
ment oi India would not have committed themselves so strongly to his sup.
pon. Anmher proposed oondition of the arrangement sliould be tlie recall of
™.. Y .”S£r, h “‘i? ”1 *•**#. Mission .nd tbe appoint!
n ent and retention there of a strong and approved Governor If all these
»ar?olcL e iMeMf n ‘ 0 ^- th ° G0ve ~ of IndTwould agreelo
LfiordThe PerTi Povlf 0 " S f M,SS,OU / very early date-a step which would
all out the Persian Government an opportunity of acting in accordance with the