'SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS AND MEASURES OF THE VICEROYALTY OF HIS EXCELLENCY LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON, VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA IN THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT. I. JANUARY 1899-APRIL 1904. II. DECEMBER 1904-NOVEMBER 1905. VOLUME IV. PERSIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF.' [‎131v] (267/386)

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to deter them ? The ascendency of Maskat over the littoral in question is so
indeterminate that our own officer, Major Cox, advises us that we can either
recognise or ignore it as we please. There is therefore no question of established
or admitted right of sovereignty, to which we could appeal. Even if we our
selves were now to recognise the authority of the Sultan over those regions and
t 0 induce him to take steps to assert it, the French Government would not hold
itself bound by our act. If it is open to Major Cox to urge the independence
of Musandim,"equally would it be open to the French. Their admission that
the Anglo-French Declaration of lb62 debars either Power from acquiring,
either by lease or by cession, any part of Maskat territory, would not be held by
them to apply to ports and harbours which they preferred to regard as independ
ent. Indeed they would at once point to our own action in 18(:4 in establishing
a telegraph station on the Maklab isthmus, without reference either to the
Sultan of Maskat or to any other authority. Even if, in the interim, the
Sultan had to some extent reasserted his power, they would still argue that this
fell short of sovereignty, since the maximum assertion of that authority that
Major Cox recommends or that the Sultan is at all likely to undeitake is the
planting in a few of the coast-ports of Walls (probably local men) who would
in all probability be obliged to content themselves, as does the Wali at Khasab,
with collecting such dues as would pay for their own maintenance, without
remitting anything in the form either of revenue or of tribute to Maskat
Still more certain is it that Fiance 'would take this line in the event of
seizure of a port or base by Russia. In no circumstances would she be likely
to interpret the Anglo-French Declaration in a sense unfavourable to her ally.
Indeed she might even, while admitting the restriction or disability imposed
upon herself, decline absolutely to join hands with us in enforcing it against
any third party.
Next, if we turn to the positive aspect of the case—not only is it desirable
that any foreign Power should be prevented Irom acquiring a base on the
Musandim promontory, but, if Admiral Bosanquet’s views are sound, and if,
as be says, that promontory is for naval purposes the most important strategical
position in the Gulf, then it would appear to follow that, if we are to prevent
our rivals from establishing themselves upon it, the only alternative is to
anticipate them by anterior action ourselves.
'Ibis brings me to the various recommendations put forward by our advisers.
In the event of our deciding not to re-introduce the Sultan of Mnskat upon the
scene, Major Cox recommends that we should again plant a Native Agent Non-British agents affiliated with the British Government. at
our old telegraph quarters near Khasab. Colonel Kemball, on the other hand,
in what seems to me a somewhat hesitating letter, advises us to do nothing. If,
he says, we re-occupy the Elphinstone Inlet, we may offend the Sultan. If
we bring in the Sultan, then we shall debar ourselves in the future, aud shall
bring him into undesirable relations with the Trueial Chiefs. I may say a word
about both alternatives. Tlie risk of offending the Sultan is, in my opinion,
infinitesimal, and is clearly disregarded by Major Cox, who is in a much better
position to know what the mind of that potentate is. AVe have merely to point
out to him, if he enquires, that the measure is one of precaution, directed against
the chance of a movement by some foreign Power which would be certain in
the end to compromise his independence, in order to remove any reasonable
objections or suspicions on his part. The resumption of our position and rights
at Maklab need not interfere with the limited amount of jurisdiction that his
solitary Wali exercises in that neighbourhood, nor need it be regarded as any
more extraordinary than our corresponding position at Bassidore. Our rights
at Bassidore, even though not actively exercised, will probably be sufficient to
keep the Russians away from Kishm, unless of course they mean fighting, and
similarly the re institution of a British post in the Elphinstone Inlet would
operate as a deterrent, except at a similar risk, to any other Power, contemplat
ing a landing in that neighbourhood.
The weak point of Colonel Kemball’s second alternative is that, in attempt
ing to exclude others (as I have shown a probably quite illusory endeavour), we
shall exclude ourselves. As for the Sultan being brought into contact with
the 1 rucial Chiefs, since this state of affairs has already existed for more than
half a century on the Batineh coast, without any detriment to either party or
to ourselves, it seems to me that it may be disregarded.