Papers of the Mesopotamian Administration (later Middle East) Committee [‎8r] (15/80)

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v • 031/Jot U again pi’os sod the point tlu.t t having regard to-’
fill that tho Indian soldiors had dono, not only in Vorsin but in
aLnoct cvoip r theatre of oporations^ they oould not oontaaplnto a
oonplotc veto on Indian iunigration.
TRP Cihllxuhm thought that it did not matter much lotting Indians
into Basrah, but as regards the irrigated land in the Baghdad Vilayet
tho -drabs v/ould resent an o::oossivo infill:: of Indians to tho onclu-
siou of themcolvos*
lid. Ch.Unh?Jh.IU suggested a fonmla to tho * effect tlmt eyov
raeasuros v;ero contemplated to protect tho Arabs, but not neoossa
■co o::c ludo I:idians.
ial
rily
C.'Ili) GrAIiulAH repeated that Basrah was now open to an unrestricted
inrlu::, and tnat preoautions must bo talcon that Baghdad va-s not
equally open. Ho thought that tho Conmiittco should await a further
expression by mo Govoi^T^^yc of India of their views.
Sift flHMAS HOhBIUkiniiho agreed, and said tnat in the meanwhile
tney could ascertain v/hat restrictions wore now in force, and vdiat
t*io Indian. Oovornnionb really meant by free immigration.
Hft. GHiMLICftLAIH further suggested that tho question of Officers
at Basrah and Baghdad sliould bo held over for tho present.
BAibjLGftAftS II. .
Tho Comir.ittoe made no comments.
RiRL®
.HIS
III S: IV.
Mft, 0:1 HBJT.hHII'I suggested tliat tho Govornncnt of India should bo
informed to tho effect that the Oommittoo 1 s general ochemo stood, and
tho British Government trusted thorn to work up to its principles.
TIIB OIEIIAMAII drew attention to bir i'orcy Coifs comments on this
paragraph and on Paragraph hill. Ho pointed out that the Adminie-
trative Council was one of local administration* Ho did not quite
under s a raid what the position of the Chiof Political Officer was to bo.
lift. ref erred to Sir ?oroy 0om T s comonte on .Paragraph
ylll. Ko thought that Hir Percy misunderstood tho Gomiaitteo f s inten
tions. Tho Committee had never proT)osod tlxat this should bo brought
into force while, the military occupation continued* All they wanted
v:as to prevent 3ir 'oroy Go:: sotting up an adninistrt-tion of hie own
^~"c^ which would render the ultimate realisation of the
ommlf te er s scheme impossible.
TIH CltllPaifJLT orrplained the nilitai'y situation on the Tigris and
iluphratos according to the latest information* . .in uji for tuna, to
factar was that tho ussians wore quite useless end ineffective.
Goner-.-,! Hmudo nais at pro sent propri’itig a defensive lino, which, ho
understood, rw.s not identical with .the frontier of tho Baghdad Vil-
ayet. Tho.Ghie.f of tho Imperial General‘Staff had informed tho War
Cabinet that morning that, in his opinion, there v/as no prospect of
tho fur ks. oo ing. able to atteveh until the late antunn. Things wore
nor hr; guioicly in that part of tho world, and it was necessary that
the Government should push alioad with their proposals. There were
air months in wliioh: to de:.l with the situation*
• ..CaIUiaIH pointed out that, \Uidor the Hague Convontion,
which precludes anneintion during a war, it would onl^ be possible
xo establish military control. . ’./hat they did not want -.tos tliat a
horde of Indian officials should cone rush in,
imposing an Indian form of ndiaini strut ion.
into
VBaghdad/
bent
on