Papers of the Mesopotamian Administration (later Middle East) Committee [‎19r] (37/80)

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I-R, CRAI''BEKLAIK caid that what Sir Percy Cox appeared to
have in mind was that, even if dtwere decided that the expert
should he attached to him, he would still he under the General
Officer Commandirg. hut he would he in a more independent
pcsiticn as he would act under Sir Percy's instructions and
it would he easj.ei for him to devise special precautions to
safeguard existing water rights. If this expert were
directly under the orders of General Maude very serious
trouble might arise. General Gray was under the General
Officer Commanding hut so far, Mr. Chamberlain understood,
those rights had not heen seriously interfered with, or rathor
that whatever interference had taken place it need not he
permanent in its effect.
THE CTLAJHMA1T said he was rather suspicious of the
phraseology employed In the Viceroy's telegram on the subject
which he thought was ambiguous. He himself was in favour of
placing the expert under Sir Percy Cox’s orders.
THE COMMITTEE decided that;-
Mr. Austen Chamberlain should draft telegraphic
instructions to meet the case, hut, before
sending them, should consult the Chief of the
Imp q.c ial Gener al 3t af f ~
THE CHAIRMAN invited the attention of the Committee for
the consideration of the third point which required their
decision and that was the Command of the South Persia Rifles.
It was evident that Sir Charles Marling thought that the
suggestion the Committee had put forward at their last Meeting
Y/ae impracticable and it would leave him in a difficult, if
not impossible; position. Sir Charles thought that the
administration of the South Persia Rifles should he under
the Army Department of the Indian Government. A scmevdmt
remarkable situation had arisen - the Commander-in-Chief in
India had stated that he was not in agreement with what was,
to all intents and purposes^ a decision of the \7ar Cabinet.
Sir Charles Monro was now attempting to make the War Cabinet
go back on their previous decision. He stated that he still
adhered to his own view of what was necessary. Lord Curzcn
asked whether it r/ould not be better for the Government of
India to assume entire rasponsibility^/the South Persia Rifles.
LORD HARDINGS said, that he had been under the impression
that the Indian Government were to be responsible for everything
connected with the South Persia Rifles, both personnel and
mat erial.
MR. CHAMBERLAIN eaid it was clear that the Indian Govern
ment and the Commander-in- Chief in particular were inclined
to distrust Sir Percy Sykes’ capacity: that being the case,
cculd the CcimrJttee insist cn the Indian Government being
responsible for the South Persia Rifles while a man in whom
they had not implicit confidence was in charge of that Perce?
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