Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎front-i] (2/290)

applicable to the new one ? He also pointed out that we might be
in honour bound not to leave to the mercy of the Bolsheviks persons
who had been faithful to our cause.
General Thwaites pointed out that General Malleson himself, in
a recent telegram, had drawn attention to the necessity, in the event
of a withdrawal, of its being so conducted as to enable our supporters
to be got away in safety. He then gave the views of the War Office
on the objects of General Malleson’s mission, and the reasons why
it was desirable to maintain it. The objects were three-fold :—
1. To prevent the Bolsheviks from penetrating into Persia.
2. To protect Krasnovodsk.
3. To hold on his front a force of 14,000 Bolsheviks, and
prevent them from attacking the Orenburg Cossacks.
He then gave an account of the organisation of the Bolshevik
army, which consisted of 12 separate armies, well provided and
equipped, and which constituted, even now, a very formidable force,
and might be largely increased in the spring. They had some
German officers, and a number of coerced officers from the old
Imperial Russian army, who had been forced by hunger or other
circumstances to join them. Perhaps the most formidable of the
Bolshevik armies was that which was threatening the Orenburg
Cossacks further north. The latter formed a wedge between two
Bolshevik forces, and if this were destroyed, the two Bolshevik forces
might combine, and would be free to march without resistance on
Persia or elsewhere.
From a military point of view, General Malleson was in a very good
position, and his military expenses, properly so called, were relatively
small, but the War Office agreed that our total financial commitments
in respect of his mission generally were too large. They were prepared
to suggest that economy should be effected in other directions, e.g., in
North-West Persia, where a saving of 12,370?. a month had already
been made. The force in the Busnire hinteiland, which was costing
about J90,000Z. a month, might also be withdrawn.
To Lord Curzon’s enquiry as to how long the War Office would
wish General Malleson to remain in Trans-Caspia, General Thwaites
replied by enquiring for how long it would be necessary for us to
maintain our position on the Caspian and on the line from Batum
to Baku.
General Cox advised as a further reason for maintaining the
forces in Trans-Caspia the necessity for making arrangements for the
removal of Austro-Hungarian prisoners, whose number was estimated
at 40,000. It was hoped soon to begin the evacuation of these
prisoners across the Caspian, but if our forces were withdrawn from
frans Caspia it would be impossible to collect them.
The Chairman pointed out that even if it were decided to leave
General Malleson in Trans-Caspia some solution would have to be
found of the difficulty of financing him, and the Treasury must be
consulted on this point.
It was suggested that Mr. Keynes should be invited to attend
the meeting:.
Mr. Keynes w'as summoned and asked on his arrival what means
existed for supplying General Malleson with funds.
Mf. Keynes said that a difficulty arose because Persian krans
were of no use to General Malleson, who required roubles. He
thought that the only roubles at present available were some which
had been bought recently at Copenhagen for the express purpose of
providing funds for the Batum--Baku line.
The Chairman reminded the meeting that the Eastern Committee
had recently decided to put a sum of 100,000?. at General Malleson’s