Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎7v] (14/290)

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pacify the Hinterland, and especially to relieve Sykes at Siiiraz. The
main object having thus been secured, the War Ollice now proposed
to withdraw the troops at present in Bushire and the Hinterland,
and at the same time put forward a suggestion that, for the future,
General Marshall should be entrusted with the execution, of our
military policy throughout Persia, exclusive of the Persian cordon.
Dealing with the three telegrams of Sir Percy Cox of 14th,
16th, and 19th January, the Chairman said they amounted to a plea
to suspend withdrawal until the Peace Conference had finished its
labours. In these telegrams the date of ultimate retirement had
been treated in a very elastic manner, suggesting an indefinite
occupation, but in one of them, (No. 49 of 19th January), Sir Percy
Cox had spoken of the early spring. His main arguments were
that he desired to strengthen the hands of the Persian Government
in the impending negotiations, and that he was opposed to the idea
of negotiating with Soulet.
In their telegram of 22nd January, 1919, the Government of
India had agreed that we should go easy with Soulet, but in his
note of the 27th January, Sir Hamilton Grant, while recognising the
serious difficulties that beset the situation, had recommended a
complete withdrawal. This was in accord with the conciliatory
attitude towards Persia consistently advocated by the Indian
Government, and it was supported by the analogy of scores of
instances on the North-West frontier Region of British India bordering Afghanistan. of India. It amounted to
this :—“ On the whole, things have got into a position where,
without further serious expenditure, we cannot run the Khans to
ground. But we have done some damage, we have shown our
might, and we have recovered our prestige. It is a good oppor
tunity to withdraw, and an excellent opportunity to prove our
friendly intentions. Let us, therefore, come to terms.”
General Uadcliffe said the War Office strongly endorsed the
opinion expressed in the note by Sir Hamilton Grant. The military
objects had been attained, and no further military gain appeared
likely to accrue from the expedition. Our prestige was high now,
and we could afford to be generous. The objection to Sir Percy
Cox’s proposal was that the prospect of relief through the action of
the Peace Conference was far from immediate. The main point to
consider was that the expedition consisted of about 10,000 men, and
the expenditure was 300,000/. a month. At the present time every
battalion that could be saved was an advantage, and men and
money could be much better employed elsewhere, for example, at
Merv, where, in the opinion of the War Office, the situation was
much more serious. From a purely military point of view nothing
but gain would accrue from withdrawal, and by withdrawal he
meant clearing out of the whole of South Persia. The War Office
had not contemplated leaving small forces at various scattered
points, and, in his opinion, it would be better to take the whole force
away or to leave it complete, than to run a risk of disaster from
scattering small detachments through the country. At the same
time, he agreed that a consular guard might be necessary.
~ Mr. Fhuckburgh quoted a note by the Secretary of State for
India which said : “ I agree entirely with Sir Hamilton Grant, and
find it difficult to justify the retention of troops.” The view of the
India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. was that there was nothing to be gained by further
military action on the Bush ire-Shiraz road. The value of that route
for commercial purposes had been changed by our occupation of
Mesopotamia. We now had a back door into Persia through
Kermanshah, and it was not worth the present large expenditure to
keep the Bushire route open. He added that Major Gough con
sidered Farman Farina could very well carry on if we left. He
would probably gain credit for having induced us to go ; and, with
a slight moral support, could fully maintain his position.