Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎24r] (47/290)

Sir Reginald Wingate said he thought that Hussein would win
fairly easily. He drew attention to a suggestion contained in a
letter from Wilson of Jeddah, recommending the appointment of a
Commission, and suggesting Hogarth, Jacob (fo'' Asir and Yemen),
two Bagdadis, and himself as its members. He thought that if,
through any fear of the possible results, we wished to avoid fighting,
it might be done by means ot such a Commission as \\ ilson had
suggested.
Mr. Philby said that the attacks of the Sherif on Khurma had
been due to his desire to set up a test case between himself and
Ibn Saud. The question at issue was to whom did the village of
Khurma and the surrounding pasture land belong. Ibn baud main
tained that it was in the babai country. The Sabai are Wahabis,
and half of them live east of Biyadh, and baud claimed that the\
are therefore within Nejd. Ihe possession of Khurma entailed
more than the possession of the village itself ; it involved tne whole
territory that w r as used for pasture by the Sabai tribe. It was, m
fact, a question of right, and Ibn Saud had agreed to the only way
by which a question of right could be decided—a British Boundaiy
Commission. But the Sherif had declined to accept this.
In reply to a question by the Chairman, he said that Ibn Saud
w as a man of about 40 years of age, who had begun his caieei as a
ruler very young. He was distinctly of the heroic type, and v as
looked upon by his people as a great chieftain ; and of course he was
the Imam of the Wahabis, and Wahabism was becoming, under
him, a distinct force in that part of the world.
Jn reply to a question by the Chairman, he said he thought it
was advantageous to us to maintain good relations with Ibn baud,
especially in view of the fact that if any other Power were left by
the Peace Conference in a position to develop influence in Central
Arabia, Ibn Saud would naturally lean towards it it convinced of our
indifference. .
We had acquiesced in his taking El Hasa from the Turks in the
early part of the war, perhaps because we could not very w r ell help it
had"we wanted to at the time. His immediate aim was not, as far
as could he seen, to capture the Holy Places. Arab conflicts being
what they are, and consisting rather of surprises than of pitched
battles, it seemed not entirely impossible that Ibn Saud should,
if he wished to do so, capture Mecca in a night. One thing was
certain : if Hussein took Khurma, Saud would certainly counter
attack.
Sir Reginald Wingate said that we had always been afraid that
Ibn Saud was in correspondence with Fakhri. Our evidence had
not, perhaps, been quite perfect, but there were very strong indica
tions that the charge was true.
Mr. Philby said that he was inclined not to believe it, though it
might, he admitted, possibly be true. He knew that Iakhri had
tried to inveigle Ibn Saud into an intrigue, because he himself had
seen letters from Fakhri ; but, so far as he knew, Saud had sent no
reply. As to loyalty, Saud was convinced that the British were
the only people worth being loyal to, but, naturally, he wanted
something in exchange for his support. At present he got ta,xes
and a British subsidy of 5,000L a month. If we stopped the subsidy,
as had been suggested, it would certainly make him hostile to us.
The attitude of his people was decidedly hostile, but this was
because they were intensely fanatical. They showed the same
hostility to all non-Wahabis. We ought to keep on good terms
• with Ibn Saud, but if we did not interfere he wotild think we had
deserted him, and there would most certainly be fighting. If a
Commission were appointed he was quite certain Ibn baud would
accept whatever decision was come to, and he himself was strongly
in favour of this solution.
[987]—281 • B 2