Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎45v] (90/290)

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should be completed before the 1 st May at latest, barman Parma
being left to make the best terms he could with Soulet.
There had followed two more telegrams from Sir Percy Cox
(Nos. 198 and 199 of the 14th March, 1919), the first giving
Hotson’s views and the second the final opinion of Sir Percy Cox.
Both pronounced strongly against evacuation, Hotson going further
than anyone and urging, not merely the retention of the troops, but
also the earlv renewal of active operations. Cox dissented from the
policv proposed by the Government of India, and urged it was
essential to our position in Persia that the troops should be retained
for the present and possibly up to the end of the hot weather.
Cox’s judgment appeared in the main to be influenced by the
general political rather than the local military situation, and but for
his fear of the reaction in Teheran he might possibly have acquiesced
in a more prompt withdrawal.
Persian politics had reached a stage which, if not critical, was
at least very complex. In Teheran we had Sir Percy Cox, a strong
man with wide experience of the blast, striving to bring the country
over to us, and a Ministry whose chiefs at least were well disposed.
In Paris, on the other hand, was the Persian delegation busying
itself with the usual Oriental intrigue, and not unlikely to be
repudiated by its own Government. So lar, the Peace Conference
had paid no attention to the delegates, and our own view was that
they would find themselves cold-shouldered in Paris. Should that
happen, Persia had no resort but to turn to London. This was what
we expected them to do. It was with this idea in the background
that Cox had deprecated any move in Persia which might weaken
our position and adversely affect us at Teheran.
Mr. Shuckbnrgh said he had been unable to consult the
Secretary of State for India, who had gone to Paris, but would read
a note from Sir T. Holderness. It was as follows : —
“ I think that the Secretary of State would be in favour of
complete withdrawal. Though in his minute of the 21 st
January he left the door open to representations that might
be received from Sir P. Cox, his strong inclination was for
evacuation.
“This, I think, was confirmed by the proceedings of the
Committee of the 4th February, at which the War Office
representative expressed the view that retention of part of the
force, split up in detachments along the road, was unsound.
“ If the War Office maintain this view, it seems to me that
it must prevail.”
He had not much to add. There was no question of retaining
the whole force. It numbered a little over 9,000 men, and cost
290,000Z. a-vmonth. The expense was prohibitive. That being so,
the most we could do was to keep on a small force. The G.O.C.,
Bushire, proposed to reduce the numbers to about 3,500 men. The
cost of this would probably be not much less than half that of the
larger force—say 140,000L a-month. If we retained even this
reduced number of men for the period indicated by Sir Percy Cox,
the total cost would be close upon 1 , 000 , 000 £. ; and before incurring
that expenditure we should remember that the necessity of main
taining any force at all was still problematical. It was by no means
certain that the results hoped for would accrue. It was common in
our experience, not only in Southern Persia, but also in many other
places, to be told that the situation would shortly clear up, and to
be asked to hold on a few months longer. We did so, and at the
end of the period the same request was made again. Either the
general situation would develop favourably or it would not. Even
if it did, the moment would always be inopportune for withdrawing ;
whereas if it did not, there was no reason why we should not with
draw at once.