Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎81v] (162/290)

idea, but only said that it had been postponed. I he Conference,
however, might, he thought, assume that the Italians would not go
there. If they did not the Caspian fleet would have to be handed
over to Denikin, but the time did not appear to have arrived for
this yet. He had taken Tsaritsin, but not Astrakhan, and
apparently required the co-operation of the British naval foices to
make sure of doing so. Whether it was desirable, pending the
transfer of the fleet to Denikin, to retain a British garrison at
Krasnovodsk was for the naval and military authorities to decide.
It "was also for them to say whether, in the event of the whole of
Trans-Caspia falling into Bolshevik hands, it would be necessary
even after the fleet had been handed over to Denikin for a hold
to be retained on Krasnovodsk. If the Bolshevik fleet weie
destroyed, it might perhaps be considered that the extension of the
bolshevik sphere to the shores of the Caspian would not constitute
a serious threat to Denikin.
General Radcliffe said that the present position was only what
had been foreseen as a possibility when it was decided to withdraw
General Malleson's force from Merv. He did not think there was
any immediate cause for alarm, but a decision had to be taken
whether General Milne should withdraw at once from Kasnovodsk,
or reinforce the small garrison there. The War Office view was that
he should not, in any case, send reinforcements, but they would
deprecate a withdrawal from Krasnovodsk before Astrakhan had
fallen. The prospects of Astrakhan falling were not so good as they
had been, but there was still reason to hope that Denikin might
succeed in capturing it before the end of the month. It appeared
from the Viceroy’s telegram No. 9218 of 8th July that the
Bolsheviks had not yet taken A>kabad. The l rans-Caspian troops
were said to be destroying the whole of the railway line east of that
town, and if this policy were pursued the Bolshevik advance might
be delayed for a long" time. He thought that the reference to the
evacuation of Askabad in General Milne’s telegram No. G.C.—51
referred to the original withdrawal of General Malleson’s force from
Trans-Caspia. He was inclined to suggest that General Milne
should be instructed not to reinforce Krasnovodsk, but at the same
time to take no premature steps for the withdrawal of the garrison.
With regard to the alternative which had been suggested by the
Viceroy, General Briggs did not think that Denikin was likely to be
able to spare any appreciable force for operations in 1 rans-Caspia.
It was, however, advisable that steps should be taken to ensure the
Trans-Caspians retiring on Krasnovodsk rather than into Persia.
Captain Coode said that the Caspian fleet was now independent
of Krasnovodsk. The only reason why it had been considered
necessary to keep the Bolsheviks out of the harbour was because it
would have provided a good deep-water base for their submarines.
These had now been driven back into Astrakhan, and were not
likely to come out again, if, indeed, they were to be reckoned with
as submarines at all. The recent naval action had shown that they
were almost a negligible factor, and he was doubtful whether they
could even submerge. In these circumstances Admiralty would no
longer press for the retention of Krasnovodsk, though it was still
considered desirable to hold it, if possible, until after the fall of
Astrakhan, when the Bolshevik squadron would presumably cease
to exist.
The Chairman said that the naval value of Krasnovodsk to the
Bolsheviks would be nil if Denikin took Astrakhan and the Bolshevik
fleet were consequently put out of action. Whether Askabad itself
had actually been taken or not was immaterial to the point at issue.
There was nothing to prevent it falling at any time, but it would be
some time before the Bolsheviks could reach Krasnovodsk. One of
the officers with whom he had lately discussed the situation in