Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎107v] (214/290)

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Sir Osmond Brock said that the Admiralty had received no
information indicating any improvement in the Bolshevik naval
forces. If Baku were not held, the provision of fuel would be very
difficult. There were stores at Enzeli which might last for about
three months, but after this it would be impossible to send oil up
through Persia. The Admiralty were independent of the oil resources
of the Baku district, and from the Government point of view the
occupation of this area would only be of value as denying the oil to
the Bolsheviks. The Persian oilfields were, however, vital to His
Majesty’s Government.
The Chairman said that the Conference were now in a position
to discuss in detail the eleven points raised in Lord Curzon s
telegram ; of these, the first five hung together and referred mainly
to the Caucasus.
Sir Arthur Hirtzel said that the case as it presented itself to
the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. was that the retention of the Caspian was of vital
importance to His Majesty’s Government. It was true that the
protection of India would commonly be ensured by military operations
on the Indian frontier, but the political situation which was likely to
arise from the Mediterranean to that frontier if the Bolsheviks
advanced into the areas under discussion could not be contemplated
with equanimity. He did not quite understand "by such a large
force as five divisions would he required to hold the eastern portion
of the line£ outlined in alternative (6).
Sir Henry Wilson explained that the reinforcement and main
tenance of troops along th&e line| would be impossible with the
transport at our disposal. The Bolsheviks would have lines of rail
way and the Caspian Sea to depend upon, while we would have
nothing. The totals had been arrived at on the assumption that it
would be impracticable to reinforce the troops on that portion of the*
line, and the numbers were accordingly greater than what might
actually be required in the first place for a successful resistance.
Mr. Winston Churchill drew attention to the two proposals
that had been made in Lord Curzon’s telegram for the disposal of
the present Caspian fleet. The first was to hand it over to the
British ISavy. He was sure that Denikin would be delighted if
the British naval personnel were to return ; he would feel this a
great encouragement; but, as an isolated measure of support now
that the position had so much deteriorated, he thought that the
sailors would be put into a very difficult position. The second
alternative was that Denikin should be invited to destroy the fleet.
He thought that this would be very wrong, nor did he think for a
moment that Denikin would agree to do it. The only way by which
pressure could be brought to bear upon him to destroy the fleet
would be by withholding some part of the supplies which were now
on their way to him, and he did not think that a threat to do this
would produce the desired result.
The Chairman suggested that the Conference should report to
Lord Curzon with regard to his first five queries that the military
authorities were of opinion that the retention of either of the two
lines outlined in alternatives (a) and (h) would require a force of at
least seven divisions, and that even this might be insufficient. That
we had not such a force to send, and that, even if we had, we could
not reinforce the eastern portion of either of them strongly enough
to be sure of holding it. YVe must therefore fall back on alternative (c).
Batum should be evacuated before a definite threat materialised,
and before we were forced into the ignominious position of with
drawing under pressure. The force in North-West Persia should
retire on to Kasvin if and when compelled to do so. If there were
any idea of employing the forces which were considered by the