Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎117v] (234/290)

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Anglo-Persian Agreement ever been concluded? Would they have
been in a better position than they were in now ? He would
repudiate the suggestion that His Majesty's Government contemplated
retiring from Persia and simply defending the.frontiers of India, thus
leaving Persia to be overrun. _ ..
It was to his mind ridiculous to imagine that the Bolsheviks
with their imperfect organisation were in a position to overrun
Persia at all. It was of course possible that they might get iis far
as Tehran, though he did not think this likely. He would he
inclined to ask the Persian Government what they proposed to do
themselves with their 10,000.000 people. He was sick of then-
whining attitude and continual complaints of bad faith, which vveie
not in any way justified by the facts, and would he glad to put an
end to them.
As to Starosselski, it should not he forgotten that he was one of
the old school, a Koltchakite or Denikinite, and that he looked at
the situation from the old Imperial Russian point of view. It was
obvious that he was doing his best to retain his position in what he
imagined to be Russian interests. He was a distinct souice of danger
to us, and yet we continued to pay him a monthly subsidy in which
the Government of India shared. .
He was inclined to the third alternative proposed by Sir Percy
Cox in his telegram of the 13th March, namely, that StarosseRki
should be informed by the Persian Government that the British
Government would no longer pay his monthly subsidy, and that he
must forthwith reduce the numbers of the Cossack Division to what
he could maintain on the 60,000 tomans 10,000 Persian dinars, or a gold coin of that value. now paid by the Persian
Government. There was a certain element of risk m taking this
course, but he thought that we should be prepared to face it.
Sir William Duke explained that the Viceroy’s telegram of the
21st February was based on the Cabinet decision communicated to
him in the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. telegram of the 10th February, 'taking this
decision as final, he had estimated that the withdrawal of General
Malleson’s force from Meshed would take five months to complete,
as the length of the route and the lack of water necessitated with
drawal in small echelons. If it began in March when the snow had
melted it might thus not be completed until August. He proposed
that a consular escort should be retained, consisting of one and
a-half cavalry squadrons at Meshed and half a squadron at Seistan,
with some light armoured cars at Meshed and possibly Ford van
transport.
With regard to the line of communication between Birjand and
Duzdap, tbe Viceroy had pointed out that if the 1,750 Seistan levies
under British officers in this tract were suddenly disbanded the result
would be to encourage Afghan raiding on British trade caravans
and to produce disorder in the country. He proposed that the
Khorasan levies in their present strength and the Seistan levies in
reduced strength, both under British officers, should be taken over
by the Persian Government, who should pay for them, while the
cost of the consular escort at Meshed and Seistan, including the
disbandment charges, should be borne in equal shares by His
Majesty’s Government and tbe Government of India. Having
described the steps that he w.ould take to carry out the Cabinet
decision, he had emphasised the objections to complete withdrawal.
The India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. , in reply, had suggested that as General Malleson
was not there to face a serious Bolshevik attack —a task which was
admittedly beyond the powers of his force—but only to counteract
Bolshevik activities and to check local disaffection, he might be able
to carry out his functions successfully it the force at Meshed and
on the line of communications were reduced.
The Chairman said that in his opinion the reduction of the
forces on the line of communication was more important and less
objectionable from a political point of view than the reduction of the