Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎123v] (246/290)

represent tiie wishes of the Assyrian community had agreed that
they should be repatriated to some area in the neighbourhoou of
Mosul. Jt would not look well if when he got to San Remo he told
the French that we had given up all that we had previously said
about withdrawing from Southern Kurdistan. He agreed with
Mr. Montagu that it would be undesirable to set up a North-East
frontier province for Mesopotamia on the analogy of the North-
West Province of India, but this was not at all what he had in mind.
What he proposed was that Kurdistan should be treated more
like the Mohmand country and the independent tribal areas lying
to the west of the Chitral road. This was a completely
independent region, with which the Government of India had
occasional trouble every twenty years or so. Waztristan, on the
other hand, with which we had a permanent connection, was a
constant source of annoyance. He did not see why the Kurds should
come down and raid Mesopotamia if they were independent. Their
chief interest was the establishment of trade connections with the
outside world.
Colonel Gribbon said the War Office view was that Suleimaniyeh
and Kirkuk were part of Mesopotamia, and should remain so. They
agreed with Colonel Wilson that it would be unnatural to cut off
these areas.
Replying to a question by the Chairman, he said that this
would not necessarily entail military expenditure on railways. The
railways were a commercial and not.a military point.
The Chairman observed that this was the argument by which
the military authorities usually justified railway expenditure.
General Radcliffe drew attention to the fact that proposals were
now under consideration for the defence and control of Mesopotamia
being undertaken by the Air Force. This was a suggestion which had
great promise and would result in the reduction of military
commitments.
The Chairman said that he had read the Air Staff’s scheme
and was rather nervous about it. An aviator must necessarily be a
young man, and it did not follow that he would necessarily be the
best person to conciliate tribesmen. This was a rare gift, which was
enjoyed intuitively by some people and came to others as the lesult
of experience.
Air-Marshal Trenchard explained that under the Air Staff’s
scheme the aviator would have no more to say to policy than a
subaltern commanding an infantry company. He was convinced
that the Air Force could undertake the control of Mesopotamia and
Kurdistan if the policy followed the lines suggested by Mr. Montagu.
Replying to a question by the Chairman, he said that in practice
the civil official would remain at his post and call up the Air Forces
as required. It was not proposed to set up aerodromes except along
the main line of communications. Native rulers would be employed
as far as possible. If a town or village became turbulent it could be
dealt with more easily from the air than on the ground. The expense
would be greatly reduced owing to there being no line of
communications.
The Chairman pointed out that our experience in the past had
shown that the mere presence of British officials, wonderful though
their influence was, was not sufficient without the presence of militia
or some similar force on the spot. He did not like the idea of force
being summoned solely for the purpose of destruction.
Air-Marshal Trenchard said that some form of militia or levies
was also contemplated in the Air Staffs scheme.
General lladcliffe suggested that in view of the possibility of
the Air Staff’s scheme being accepted, it would be a pity to withdraw