File 3443/1914 Pt 2 'German War: German emissaries to Afghanistan' [‎139r] (287/490)

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Ilia Britannic Majesty’s Consul, Kerman, telegraphs as follows:—
No. 64, dated July 13th. Two more German parties are
reported to be moving. Pirst consists of one Austrian officer, two Austrian-
^ s °ldiers, four Persian sowars, six fanatics and twenty mules : party
left Ispahan on the night of July 10th.
Second party consists of eight Germans, ten Caucasians, three Persian
sowars and twenty-two mules; they left last night to overtake the others at
Gulnahad. Destination said to be Tabas. Ends.
Telegram P., No. 68, dated the 14th (received 15th) July 1915.
From—-His Britannic Majesty’s Minister, Tehran,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Depart
ment, Simla. r
Urgent, Please refer to my telegram No. 242.
The crisis in regard to the Cabinet still continues and although it seems
a certainty, that office will be retained by Ain-ed-Dov leh he already talks of
doing so without the Minister of Interior Parman Parma. Ain-ed-Dowleb
will, should this final concession be made to the pro-German party, be so
dependent on them that to expect that anything effective will be do'ne to
check German action here will be hopeless. As it is by the resignation of
the Ministry, the small beginning to fulfil frequent promises made to
me to bold up German emissaries proceeding east has been arrested. The
whole fact of the matter is that there is a very general belief, which is
carefully fostered by the Turks and Germans, and from which Ain-ed-Dowleh
is by no means exempt, that our allies and ourselves are in desperate position;
contrast is being drawn between the mild action taken for the murder of her
Vice-Consul at Ispahan by Russia and the vigour with which she would in the
past have displayed her displeasure at such an occurrence, and the conclusion
is drawn that even in Persia, Russia is really powerless to help herself. No
doubt Ain-ed-Dowleh may know better, but he prefers not to risk with the
noisy demorcratic minority in the Mejlis his present popularity by taking
measures of an energetic nature to put an end to the constant and flagrant
violation by Germans and their allies of Persian neutrality, and he thinks that
lie can satisfy us with promises and half measures as we do not show ourselves
capable of protecting our own interests here. In regard to the future
he reflects that if friction between the two legations were possible during the
war when their Governments were allies, disagreements between them in
future may make it possible for Persia to play one Power off against the other
as before the Agreement of 1907.
With this state of things in the-Capital we are now confronted with an
attack on the Bushire Residency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, established in the provinces and regions considered part of, or under the influence of, British India. , an attack of which the Persian Government
had had every knowledge and warning and which is beyond question directly
due to German intrigue. I submit that it is absolutely imperative coming as
it does on the outrage at Ispahan, that decisive action should at once be taken
by Russia and ourselves and 1 would urge for the consideration of the two
Governments that Russian forces at Resht and Kasvin should be raised to
-5,000 men with a proper proportion of guns and cavalry (which Ain-ed-Dowleb
now agrees is necessary) and that Mokammerah, Lingah, Bunder Abbas and
Bushire should be seized and Hormuz occupied and that when we have done
£0 the Persian Government be informed that until reparation is made for the
attack at Bushire and until German intrigues are put a stop to, by the arrest
of the various German Agents now at work in Persia, we shall retain possession
of these towns.
If Ain-ed-Dowleh should not retain office such action (will become all
,tbe ?) more necessary.
If we fail to do this we must be prepared to see the Germans free to do
what they like, except where we are able to use our own resources, and to
be exposed to the possibility of furtfl o r outrages.