‘Seistan Persia & Seistan’ [‎147v] (299/617)

The second objection which may he urged is that our action would he
resented hy the Russians and will lead to countermoves on their part. I fully
recognise the force of this objection. No one can hare realised more clearly
than I have done the inexpediency of provoking Russia hy an appearance
of overactivity. I have repeatedly impressed this view upon our officers in
Persia, and my memorandum of 1895 and later despatches, notably of August
14th, 1896, show how constantly the idea has been present in my mind. Nothing
can he more foolish than fussy demonstrations, or attempts to gain small
successes at the expense of the Russians; and except when active measures are
necessary for the maintenance of our material interests, I would never advocate
them. I have throughout recognised that our proper course in this country is
to stand on the defensive and to avoid striking at the Russians, or performing
any risky evolutions which might tempt them to fall upon us. But at the
same time it seems to me that there must be limits to our caution in these
respects, and that, if we are to maintain our position in Persia, we must be prepared
to face a certain amount of displeasure on the part of the Russians. As I have
shown in this despatch they do not remain inactive because we do so. Our absten
tion, at the instance of the Government of India, from interference in Seistan, has
not prevented them from pushing down to the Afghan frontier and trying to
strangle our Indian trade, or from endeavouring with some success to establish
their trade and influence in Seistan itself. Our studious friendliness in Tehran,
though pleasantly reciprocated, does not prevent them from doing all they can
to injure our Bank, the Russian “ Banque des Prets ” getting "up runs upon
if, and even the Russian Legation refusing its notes. Nor has our friendly
attitude prevented them from establishing a Consulate in Ispahan, or pushing
on the construction of the Resht road. Whether we remain quiet or not the
Russians, very properly, go on working for their own hand, and unless we make
an effort sooner or later we shall find ourselves being quietly elbowed out of
one position after another. If we do not make the effort now, we certainly
may provoke them to increased activity, but it may have a contrary effect, and
in any case I believe that, if we keep strictly within our rights, and make no
unnecessary demonstrations, we have no need to be afraid of what they can do.
They ought not to be able to meet us on equal terms in our zone. Every
Persian believes that sooner or later the country will be divided between
England and Russia, and the Southerner, from the Zil-es-Sultan downwards,
looks to coming under the rule of England. In a loosely knit country like
Persia, the weak central Government cannot easilv override local influence
In this respect it is fortunate for us that the "Persians have fixed their
capital so far north as Tehran. Even in Tehran, moreover, the influence
of the Russians has its limits. Their geographical position makes them
a threatening power in the north, and as most of the Government officials
at Tehran are Northerners, with property and interests in the north, the
influence _ of the Russians in Tehran is no noubt considerable. The northern
official thinks it wise to keep on good terms with his future masters. But it
must be remembered that the Persian lives from day to day, and thinks the
country will probably last his time, and being inordinately conceited, not to
say arrogant, the Persians are far from liking the Russians, whose overbearing
ways they find it hard to endure. Altogether the Russians are not omnipo
tent in Tehran, on the contrary, although the Persian Government is very
much afraid of them, it still opposes to them a steady passive resistance about
which they complain very bitterly. I he Shah and his advisers, who believe
that we shall take the south, only if Russia takes the north, will go as far as
they dare in helping us to resist Russian encroachment, and if we show that
we are m earnest, I think they will go a long way. It must not be thought
that they are entirely under Russian domination. They are not Therefore
in my opinion we should make up our minds that the time has now come for
us to lay down a definite line of policy in Persia, and that for the future we
must adhere to it, without too much regard for any displeasure which we mav
thereby cause to the Russians. ^
20
Foreign Office Press—No. 818—1C-8-99—60.