‘Seistan Persia & Seistan’ [‎162r] (332/617)

fi nd T a certain sum offered to him in hard cash, he would give over
rne mint to the Imperial Bank, or any one else we liked to name. So it would
n ' U -. 1 °^ lei matters.. If this Legation could dispose of large sums it could if aid were granted on
. a mos anything it pleased with the Shah. Nothing could be more alar s e scale,
inexped ient than the grant to him of a yearly subsidy, which is what he wants. shah’Tconc’essionsf' ’
e wou cl do nothing whatever if once the subsidy was fixed and secure jj tut by 0/ /B /
fn of . Payment for value received we could get practically anything
the tehah could give. . He would appoint any Governors we chose to name. He
wou d without hesitation depose the Sadr-i-Azam, who keeps his power simply
because he. succeeds in providing the Shah with money. The Shah’s
concessions, in fact, would be limited by nothing but his fears, by the threats of
e Russians, or the prospect of a popular outbreak. It is difficult to put this
point too plainly.
I presume, however, that Her Majesty’s Government would not care to But drastic reform
enter upon a policy of the kind I have, described, or to lend the Shah a million feiuf SadrJ.Azam 11
and undertake the reorganization of his finances on the terms proposed by the Therefore consideTtion
toman 10,000 Persian dinars, or a gold coin of that value. Bank, which would probably involve, as I have explained, the fall of should be limited to
the Sadr-i-Azam. I will confine myself, therefore, to a consideration of what R|gie a debt m matter '° f
we might effect by helping the Persian Government only in the matter of the
Regie debt.
I must preface the consideration of this question by stating that during the shah’s formal requests
last few days the Shah, while pressing for help about the debt, has twice foradvice -
formally asked me to obtain for him the advice of Her Majesty’s Government
as to what reforms he should undertake, i( whether in the finances, or the
army, or the administration of justice.” I would observe, to prevent mis
conception, that I have not invited this request hy holding out any hopes that
the Regie Loan would be paid off. On the contrary, I have steadily declined
to admit that there was any likelihood of the matter being considered hy Her
Majesty’s Government, and have declined even to promise that I would make
any recommendation to that effect. I have pointed out that such a measure of
pecuniary aid would be useless to save Persia from bankruptcy, and that it was
unreasonable to expect aid from England wdien Persia was doing nothing to help
herself.
It is possible that this argument may have suggested to the Shah that a
request for advice about reforms might be a good move, but the request w-as
quite spontaneous and unconditional.
Of course, too much importance must not be attached to it. The Shah, if
he had once got his money, would always he able to find excuses for not acting
upon any advice which he might have received, and, as I have told him,
lie must know better than any one the causes of the present state of
things. Nevertheless,! believe that both the Sadr-i-Azam and the Shah are at Probably actuated by
this moment really impressed with the serious nature of the position into which p aliz ? t f n of '. senous
tney nave dnlted, and that they might possibly be wullmg to do something m
the way of reform if it did not involve too great a sacrifice. The Sadr-i-Azam
tells me that the constant anxiety about money is becoming such a strain that
he is getting quite worn out, and the Shah at his last interview with me spoke
very strongly about it. It is just possible that the advice they receive may to
some extent be followed.
At all events, the Shah has deliberately asked for advice, and whether it is Opportunity for plain
followed or not, I suppose it must be given. Wb have at least an opportunity s P eakin ?-
for plain speaking, and even if much does not come of it the result can hardly
be bad.
I do not know whether it will be expected that I should make any
suggestions as to the nature of the advice wdiich should be offered, but I shall
perhaps be excused if I say a few words on the subject.
With regard to the administration of justice, I would suggest that it would Administration of
be undesirable to enter into details. Whatever is said may be twisted into an importancl^ pnmary
attack upon the Mullas, who really administer what justice there is, and the
matter is not one of the first importance. The Persians do not require an
elaborate judicial system, and could not work one.
With regard to the army, it is evident that the sound thing is to pay the Army,
troops regularly, and attend to their well-being in other ways, so that they may Necessity for regular
become a trustworthy force, upon which the Persian Government can depend payment of tioops.
for the maintenance of order. But the Shah does issue with fair regularity the
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