‘Seistan Persia & Seistan’ [‎186r] (380/617)

“We have recently heard of the resignation of the Amin-ed-Dowleh, on whom
the title of Sadr-i-Azam was conferred as lately as last December, and from whom and
from his colleagues so much was apparently hoped for in the direction of reforms.
We are as yet without precise information as to the significance or cause of the Sadr-i-
Azam’s resignation.”
The fact is that the cause of the late Sadr-i-Azam’s resignation, or rather
removal, was precisely the arrangement for the control of the customs duties.
Unable to find any money for the daily expenses of the Shah and the conduct of the
Administration, and feeling that his retention in power depended upon his doing so,
the unfortunate Sadr-i-Azam very reluctantly accepted the offer of a small loan from
the Imperial Bank, and put their receivers in charge of the customs. The measure
was intensely unpopular among the Persian merchants, who had to pay their customs
dues, and among the officials at head-quarters, who resented the interference of the
Peringi.
The Sadr-i-Azam was loudly denounced for having “sold Bushire to the
English,” and in a few weeks he was dismissed from office. He is now living in
seclusion at Tehran, never leaving his house, and his lifelong rival, the Amin-es-
Sultan, who is opposed to all reform, and was strongly supported by the Russians, has
been appointed Sadr-i-Azam in his place.
In my Memorandum of 1895 I explained the great difficulty of effecting any
reforms, notably in the customs system, and I added:—
“ By pressing for them inconsiderately, we run the risk not only of failure, but of
making ourselves disliked by the Shah and Sadr-i-Azam and other influential persons,
and of driving them into the arms of Russia.”
These words are just as true now as they were in 1895, and I would earnestly
recommend that we should act with great caution in these matters. If we contemplate
at any time helping the Persians to a loan, we should avoid insisting upon the
immediate control of the custom-houses. A clause providing that control will he
given if the instalments on the loan are not paid is, I think, the utmost that .we
require. The custom-houses at Bushire, Lingah, and Bunder Abbas, through which
passes yearly over 3,000,000/. of trade, lie under the guns of our ships, and we could
at any time put a boat’s crew and a bank agent in possession of each, even if we had
no Agreement at all. In my opinion, therefore, we can guarantee a loan, and thus let
Persia ha--e money at very low interest, and put her under a real obligation without
any appreciable risk. 1 hope that this view of the case maj' be considered by Her
Majesty’s Government, and thatwe shall, in the case of another loan being contemplated,
rely on our power rather than on material guarantees.
I doubt whether that power is fully recognized by ourselves. The Persians have
no doubt of it. They see that our frontier, that is, the frontier of Kelat and the sea,
not to speak of Afghanistan, marches with theirs for 1,500 miles. They know very
well that the Russians cannot help them in the south and south-east, and that m the
Gulf Provinces such show of authority as they still exei'cise depends upon our
forbearance, if not upon our support. For example, the port of Lmgah is now m
possession of a revolted Arab Sheikh, whom the Persians have recognized as Governor.
They have no power to coerce him, and begged me to send a gun-boat to do so. He
would most gladly hoist our flag to-morrow. On the Karun also the Arabs are m
possession, and ready at a word from us to throw off the semblance of lersian
^ The Gulf ports Mohammerah, Bushire, Lingah, and Bunder Abbas are at the
mercv of our ships. So great is the respect of the Persians for our power that even
£ the extreme north of our zone, among the fanatical town-bred population of
Ispahan any demonstration on our part has immediate effect, two or three yeais ago
there was t/ouble in Ispahan, and the Mollahs were stirring up mischief against the
Europeans It happened that at this moment a British squadron was sent mto Tuikish
wa eTs and news oT the movement was brought to Persia by the pubhc telegrams.
The Missionary Bishop at Ispahan wrote to inform me that the hostile demonstrations
airainst the Europeans had ceased at once, and that the attitude of the Mollahs had
comnletely changed. He said that the change was caused by the news about our
fle“tf which was apparently interpreted as an indication that the English were getting
angry, mo^t al sens itiyeness was shown last year when the news of the battle of
Omdurman became known. It spread like wildfire all over the f of
tim notice^Four officers. I mention these facts to show that we are greatly feared in