‘Seistan Persia & Seistan’ [‎278r] (563/617)

superfluous despatch, 0 whTeh ifbJth the summin* woi ° f thiS Ve r y '“f 1 ly ’ but not > 1 ho P«.
the Secretary of State about our Consular and rffl ^ * ( ; 0r v r v S P 0ndenc ® of lon & duration with
response to particular enquiries addr^sed to ot . her establlshra e n ts m Persia; the suggested
Sir M. Durand; and an ItCpt-so far as I can ^P^fcom
place upon a definite footino- the share of resnnn^Vrff tbat ? a . s been ma de—to
upon the Government of fndia and to indi/af 1 r ^ °J ^ er ® ia legitimately devolves
least, are the objects which I taVlt v?ew inVriti™ if Td^fl, for ■ 1W ’ at
degree, shape or permanence to our policy towards Pers?* ™ I If , r f dt Z'™’ in an y
wasted. ^ ^ S1 ‘ i, P er l ia P s the labour will not have been
whole ofany part fhe dra™/ T' m0 ^ IT “ SUS » eS ‘ ionS 0n the
September 14th. despatch, if approved, will not leave until the mail of
C[urzon],—2-9-99.
I have studied these papers with great interest.
The draft despatch practically divides itself into two parts. The first deals with the
momentous question of how best to prepare for the break up of Persia, an event which seems
the British EnlDire TTictc 1 * , IS . md,s P u ‘ abk . ma / vast and far-reaching importance to
ii f . P ^second is one of only financial administrative detail, viz. bow to
Indian^Exclmquers 3 ^ 63 ^ 0nnected with the P r0 P 0 sed arrangements) between the Home and
I confess I should like to have seen these two subjects treated in separate despatches. To
discuss a matter of such a different degree of importance as the affirmation of the policy which is
to govern tue action of the Empire in a position of snob arnvifv in -inYfarwnoifirm nrifu
1 will explain in Council why this has been done.
CftTRZON].
to govern the action of the Empire in a position of such gravity, in juxtaposition with the
question of the division of a few thousand
pounds between Great Britain and India is, I
, ii.ji.j-i. in „ venture to think, incongruous, and I fear is rather
calculated to disoract attention from the main and weighty issue. Neither Great Britain nor
. . a are ’ trust,, in such a financial position as to make the sum in question an item of any
significance by tne side of the other.issue which involves matters intimately connected with the
maintenance of our Indian dominion and the security of the eastern trade of the Empire
generally on which so considerable a portion of our greatness depends.
I venture to submit that, in the first of the two despatches into which I should like to see
the present draft divided, it would be sufficient to indicate the general lines on which any
expenditure involved in the immediate proposals might be distributed between England and
India, leaving the details to be worked out when the general policy to be adopted was finally
decided upon.
If I correctly interpret the policy which it is intended to enunciate, it is that, while we
desire to maintain the integrity and independence of Persia so long as practicable, we recognise
the improbablity of the date of the break up of that power being far distant, and we desire,
therefore, to now take all suitable means for consolidating our position in the portion of that
State which must eventually fall to our lot if we are to maintain our Imperial position in the
East.
The line selected for the ultimate boundary
between Russia and England in those parts
appears to be by common consent the Khanikin-
Seistau one. It is stated in the draft despatch,
however, that under existing conditions we have
neither the money nor the men to undertake
such a responsibility.
May I venture to question this dictum ? Should we adopt in the future such a programme
as the absorption of the southern and central portions of Persia up to the Khanikin-Seistan line,
it appears to me that the whole position of affairs would be altered. Concurrently with an
unquestionably great increase in responsibilities in Persia, we would obtain very important relief
in the pressure on our Indian frontier. The strategical position would le entirely changed.
Resting on England in the west, India in the east, and the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. to the south, we
would so threaten Russians advance on India that it seems to me the latter country would, for
the time at any rate, he practically safe. Instead of Russia constantly worrying us, she
It is an indisputable proposition that neither the
Indian army, a< at present constituted, nor the Indian
Exchequer, is equal to the stiain of assuming a British
Protectorate over the whole of the centre and south of
Persia. Nor is it worth while to discuss such a contin
gency since no British Ministry is at all likely to autho
rise it—at least for many a year to come.
C[ttbzon].