‘Seistan Persia & Seistan’ [‎279v] (566/617)

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,, , arpater for. if no agreement is signed, I think it is
d‘rL?C eflort S ^ugh r c 0 onstot,t and well considered, would have to be unostentatious and
^Ivhlt'prTcisrerperrturllrtL^Wency either of a partition of Persia into spheres or
VAhat precise expeuu r^rl^n revenues may be called upon to bear, it is impossible
of a continuance of the a u m ’? > ; j j t i,; n k SO me expenditure is justifiable and inevitable.
^THL^n/^tittltokno item of militaj or political expenditure with the
exception of the re-armament of our native troops is probably more urgent
But it must be recollected that we have practically reached the limits of taxation m India ;
that indeed the salt-tax is too high and ought to be reduced to give us the one financial reserve
possible for emergencies; that the demands for military expenditure are enormous; and that,
though we expect to place our currency on a sound basis, and thereby to quicken the develop
ment’ of India's resources, the effect of this reform will not show itself m our revenue for some
time to come.
However looking to the masterly analysis of Imperial and Indian interests in Persia in
this draft to the striking disproportion between the Imperial and Indian contributions m Persia
and Turkish Arabia A term used by the British officials to describe the territory roughly corresponding to, but not coextensive with, modern-day Iraq under the control of the Ottoman Empire. now revealed, and to the fact that our demand for a revision of this expendi
ture is likely to be powerfully supported by Lord Wei by's Commission it is not improbable
that the policy now advocated will result in some immediate saving to India.
In connection with the question of revision, it is important to determine what principle
shall govern the division of financial responsibility between the Imperial and Indian Exchequers.
Two alternative principles are proposed—
(1) The whole cost of diplomatic, consular, naval, telegraphic and other charges in
Persia and Turkish Arabia A term used by the British officials to describe the territory roughly corresponding to, but not coextensive with, modern-day Iraq under the control of the Ottoman Empire. might be divided in some fixed proportion.
(2) The Imperial and Indian Governments might, respectively, accept responsibility for
those areas in which Imperial or Indian interests predominate, with a joint contri
bution towards the central (Tehran) establishment.
There are arguments on either side; but I incline to the latter arrangement, if it can be
carried out.
My reasons are that, if India were responsible for the Indian area—which would, I take
it, include Seistan—any action to be taken
could be taken more quickly and more quietly.
That is chiefly a political reason, though there
is much to be said for having our contribution
entirely within our control. And, financially,
references to London for increasing any part of
a total contribution divided in fixed proportions
would be troublesome. Moreover, if, in an
very likely find it difficult to get the Home
I quite agree with Mr. Dawkins’s preference, and aho
with his reasons for arriving at it. 1 would add another,
viz , that the second arrangement is far more likely to he
accepted by the Home Government than the first. I am
willing to add a paragraph as suggested. On the other
hand, it must he remembered that under the second
plan India will certainly have to pay more (and pro
bably in an increasing ratio) than under the first.
C[ukzon].
emergency, we anticipated London, we should
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Government to accept any responsibility for the amount expended in anticipation.
Possibly some argument in this direction could be introduced into paragraph 69 of the
draft.
I may illustrate my contention by a reference to such expenditure as the Quetta-Seistan
route may entail. Such expenditure must, I think, grow in a tentative and gradual manner
and by small amounts at a time.
I had hoped to be able to append to this note some remarks on the figures given in the
draft of the Imperial and Indian shares of the existing expenditure. These figures are being
cheeked and examined in the Finance Department, but I regret that the process is not yet
finished, and I did not like to delay this note further.
If 1 have any remarks to make, I will submit them separately. They will not, in any case,
touch the principles laid down in the draft.
C. E. D [awrists], —7-9-99.
I quite concur in the policy outlined, and have no criticism to offer on the details.
I should* like to have some further information on the military part of the question : say,
a note showing the bases from wdiich, and the
lines along which, we can move troops towards
the Persian frontier. Perhaps the Military
Members of Council can explain this part of
the case.
* I do not think that a note will he required. With the
assistance of my Military Colleagues, I can explain the
matter in Council.
C[tjezon].
if W e^Lrfi i lr.t 0 ^ 0rV0t i n , gt0 r P0Str0netl,eKhyWaIldKab ” 1 ™ IIe y Proposals was that,
, spend money and possibly stir up quarrels m that direction, we may hamper ourselves in
the important work of strengthening; our position towards Persia and the Gulf
T. R[aliigh], —7-9-99.