Letters and Papers Concerning the Trans-Persian Railway and Other Railways in Persia [‎141v] (282/442)

1925
Supply (Committee). HOUSE OF COMMONS Foreign Office. 1926
[Earl of Ronaldshay.]
ally speaking, they have done so, but
there are some regions in the very wide
field which is covered by Anglo-French
and by Anglo-Russian diplomacy where,
as it seems to me, they have at times been
a little slow to meet us. For instance,
the French Government did not show any
willingness to waive the strict letter of
their rights at Muscat, in spite of the fact
that if they had been willing to do so they
would have rendered very much easier
the very arduous task which we have
undertaken in that part of the world,
namely, suppressing the arms traffic in the
Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. . Nor have Russia shown
any great readiness to appreciate the very
special position which we occupy and
which we must inevitably occupy in
Persia.
I should like to explain in a sentence
why it is I support the general lines of the
right hon. Gentleman’s policy so far at
any rate as the Triple Entente is con
cerned. I do so for a very simple reason.
I believe that policy to be absolutely
necessary to maintain the balance of power
in Europe. So long as the balance of
power is in a state approximating to equi
librium you have a strong possibility,
amounting, I think, to a probability, of
peace being maintained. If, on the other,
hand, you get one Power, or a combina
tion of Powers, attaining a position of
great military superiority, then that pro
bability, I think, vanishes. Everybody
knows it was that prospect, the prospect
of the Triple Alliance, obtaining a position
in Europe of overwhelming military
superiority, which drove this country to
abandon its position of isolation. The
Powers composing the Triple Alliance have
for some time controlled a military force
of tremendous power, approximating, I
believe, at the present time to something-
like 10,000,000 men on a war footing. There
was every prospect of that tremendous
military engine being enormously en
hanced, when in 1900 Germany brought in
their Navy Law and proceeded to add to
that immense military force an enormous
naval fleet. The only object of this coun
try throwing in its lot, as it were, with
France and Russia, was in order to restore
the balance of power, which was being
disturbed by this immense accession of
military force by the combination of
Powers in the Triple Alliance to a state
of equilibrium, by throwing the British
Fleet, as it were, into the lighter scale.
For my part, I have always believed it
should not be necessary to take any step
which could be in any way interpreted as
hostile to Germany. It has always
seemed to me there were very many
reasons why we should co-operate with
Germany, and very few reasons why we
should not do so. Germany has no terri
torial frontiers, at any rate of importance,
impinging on the territories of this coun
try, and in her possessions in the different
parts of the world she has pursued a far
less exclusive commercial policy than have
other Continental countries. But I am
driven from my original attitude towards
Germany by the position which Germany
has herself taken up. I have realised it
has been necessary to recognise the
danger of the balance of power being up
set, and, having recognised that, I
hold it would be the very height of
folly were anything to be said or anything
to be done calculated to create in the
minds of either the French or Russian
people the idea that we were not abso
lutely sincere in our intentions to co
operate cordially with them.
Both Russia and Great Britain have
special interests in Persia, and recent
events have, I am afraid, shown that those
interests are not altogether identical. A
perusal of the correspondence which has
recently been published seems to show that
Russia has been a little backward in recog
nising the requirements of our special posi
tion in that country, with the result that
the wheels of the diplomatic machine in
that part of the world have not moved
quite so smoothly as we should have
desired during the past few months. What
are the special requirements of our posi
tion in that part of the world 1 The prime
necessity from our point of view is the
maintenance of an independent Persia.
There are many reasons for that, but there
are two reasons of paramount importance.
The first is that we must maintain a buffer
State between our Indian Dominions and
the great military Continental Powers ;
and the second is the necessity under
which we always labour of taking into con
sideration the sentiments of the Mahome-
dan world. I need not labour the first of
those two points, and, with regard to the
second of them, I need only say that it is
not only the 70,000,000 Mahomedans in
India whom we have to take into con
sideration, but we also have to take into
consideration the kingdom of Afghanistan.
The House will remember the Anglo-
Russian Convention was signed five years
ago, and it will also remember it was laid