Letters and Papers Concerning the Trans-Persian Railway and Other Railways in Persia [‎153r] (305/442)

Cfs5
1971 Supply (Committee).
tirely from a speech like that of the hon.
Member for East Mayo, emphasising what
the state of things was before the Anglo-
Bussian Agreement was made.
Russia may urge, and urge with truth,
that before the Anglo-Russian Agreement
was made the independence of Persia w T as
very qualified, that Russian influence was
supreme in the North of Persia, and that
the Shah of Persia was entirely under
Russian influence. I am bound to say from
v T hat I have heard from British Ministers
who may have been at Teheran in old days
that the Shah of Persia did regard his
own position somewhat from that point of
view. When they urged him to do this or
that in British interests, or to assert his
independence, then, as one Shah of Persia
used to say, he replied: “That is all very
well, but look at Teheran on the map.” I
sometimes wonder whether everybody v T ho
talks in this House about Persian affairs
knows exactly Avhere Teheran is. “I am
in Teheran; look wdiere the Russians are.
They are practically at my doors. They
can send troops here whenever they please.
I should be delighted to do what the Bri
tish Minister wants, but what is Great
Britain going to do to protect me at
Teheran 1 ?” To that no answer was given
then; and to that no answer is given now
by those who wish, as far as I can see, to
go back to the old state of affairs, which
was something very different from what
they believe it to have been. But for the
Anglo-Russian Agreement the ex-Shah
would still be there. He certainly would
be there at the present time, unless the
Russian Government at the critical moment
had entirely abstained, and had ordered
their officers to abstain from any interven
tion. “Yet,” says the Noble Lord oppo
site. “he came back to Persia the other
day.” Yes, and he also went away again.
It was in the North of Persia he Avas, and
not in the South, Avhere our influence might
be exercised; and he would not have gone
aw r ay again but for the advice and Avarn-
ing given him by the Russian Government.
All that has to be borne in mind, and, in
judging the state of things in Persia, you
really have to consider not Avhether the
Anglo-Russian Agreement has brought
about a perfect state of things, but Avhether
it has made things better or worse than
they wmuld have been if no such Agreement
had existed.
You have to bear in mind that in Russian
opinion before this Agreement her in
fluence was supreme in Persia, and that in
the chaos which succeeded in Persia her
Government might and Avould, but for the
Foreign Office. 1972 •
Anglo-Russian Agreement, have made its
influence still more supreme at Teheran
than it ever had been before. She might
practically have annexed the North of Per
sia. She might have pursued from that
basis a forward policy of railways, and so
forth, towards our Indian frontier. Under
the Anglo-Russian Agreement the Russian
Government has given up the forward
policy Avhich it did pursue, and Avhieh it
might have pursued in that part of Asia or
at any rate Avhich some people thought it
might have pursued before the Agreement^
Avas made. From that point of view the i
Agreement has been to Russia a self-deny
ing ordinance Avith regard to that policy,
and they wmnt to knoAV what they have
gained. Take the point about Afghani
stan. There Avas a condition to the Agree
ment that the Ameer of Afghanistan
should sign. Oriental rulers are very sus
picious, and he has not signed it. Russia,
however, has entirely Avaived that condi
tion in practice, and has loyally observed
that part of the Agreement, although it
has not been actually signed by the Ameer
of Afghanistan. It Avas an Agreement
essentially in the interests of Afghanistan.
That neither Great Britain nor Russia
should pursue a forward policy is
obviously the very thing to preserve
Afghanistan from being interfered
Avith. Oriental rulers are suspicious,
and from the mere fact that an
Agreement has been made in those terms
they assume it must have been made at
their expense. As a matter of fact, it has
been an enormous safeguard to Afghani
stan. When you look at the Agreement as
a whole, and when you consider all the
trouble there has been, Avhat would haA’e
happened, not in Persia only, but in regard
to the general relations between Russia
and Great Britain if the Agreement had
not been in existence l I say the mainten
ance of that Agreement is more than exer
necessary.
The state of things with which we have
to deal in Persia to-day, unsatisfactory as
it is I admit, is as nothing compared with
the complications that would have arisen
if there had been no such Agreement. But
for that Ave should have had no guarantee
that the Russian influence in the North of
Persia Avould not have been used for a
further forward policy of railways and so
forth towards the Indian frontier in a way
that might have been most inconvenient
to us. But for that Agreement Russia
would have been constantly under the mis
apprehension that we in Southern Persia
n
10 July 1912